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SPORT AS SPEECH 
Genevieve Lakier* 
“Whoever wants to know the heart and mind of America had better learn 
baseball . . . .” 
Jacques Barzun1 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans love sports.  We love to play sports, we love to talk 
about sports, but mostly we love to watch them.  While only roughly 
sixteen percent of people in the United States age fifteen and older 
play sports and exercise on a regular basis,2 a recent poll found that 
over half of all Americans regularly watch football on television.3  In 
2005, over seventy-four million people attended a Major League 
Baseball game.4  In 2011, over 111 million people watched the televi-
sion broadcast of the Super Bowl—making it the most watched 
network event in twenty years.5  Super Bowl viewership in 2012 was 
higher still.6  The tremendous popularity that spectator sports enjoy 
in the United States is a consequence of the pleasure and meaning 
that viewers find in the activity.  Watching games offers audiences an 
excitement that may be otherwise missing from daily life in a com-
 
 * Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to 
Barry Friedman, Robert Post, Geoffrey Stone, Mark Tushnet, Omar Kutty, Daniel Abebe, 
Amy J. Cohen, Tabatha Abu El-Haj, and Brian Levy for reading and commenting on 
drafts of this paper. 
 1 GOD’S COUNTRY AND MINE:  A DECLRATION OF LOVE SPICED WITH A FEW HARSH WORDS 159 
(1954). 
 2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sports and Exercise, in BLS SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS 1 (2008), 
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/sports/pdf/sports_bls_spotlight.pdf. 
 3 Harris Interactive, Inc., America’s Sport—A Majority of Americans Watch NFL Football, THE 
HARRIS POLL 1, 2 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/ HI-Harris-
 Poll- Adweek-Football-2011-10-14.pdf. 
 4 Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, The Size and Scope of the Sports Industry in the United 
States 11 (Int’l Assoc. of Sports Economists, Working Paper No. 08-11, 2008). 
 5 Ben Klayman, Super Bowl Packs in Record U.S. TV Viewer Total, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-superbowl-ratings-
idUSTRE7163GS20110207. 
 6 Mason Levinson, Super Bowl Sets TV Record: 111.3M Viewers, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 6, 
2012),http: //www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-06/ giants-21-17-super-bowl-victory-
 over-new-england-misses-tv-ratings-record.html. 
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plex, industrialized society.7  They also provide important symbols of 
national identity.  As President Bill Clinton noted in 1988, “America, 
rightly or wrongly, is a sports crazy country . . . and we often see 
games as a metaphor or a symbol of what we are as a people.”8  For 
individuals, supporting the home team can provide a powerful means 
of expressing and forging membership in the community.9  For many, 
it may also be a deeply emotional experience. 
Nevertheless, despite extensive evidence of the personal, cultural, 
even political significance that the act of watching sports can possess, 
courts have largely rejected the possibility that spectator sports are 
expressive acts and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.  
Few commentators have disagreed.10  This is despite the fact that, over 
the past several decades, courts have recognized an increasing array 
of expressive conduct to fall within the protection of the First 
 
 7 NORBERT ELIAS & ERIC DUNNING, QUEST FOR EXCITEMENT:  SPORT AND LEISURE IN THE 
CIVILIZING PROCESS (1988) (asserting that sports provide a “mimetic excitement” other-
wise missing from life in industrialized society). 
 8 Kathryn Jay, MORE THAN JUST A GAME:  SPORTS IN AMERICAN LIFE SINCE 1945, at 2 (2004). 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9 See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 10 In a 2004 article, Howard Wasserman argued that “sport carries political and social mes-
sages” and “is a proper vehicle through which a message or meaning may be presented 
and expressed.”  Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 367, 374–76 (2004).  Wasserman is alone among legal academics in suggesting that all 
spectator sports deserve categorical First Amendment protection.  Other scholars have 
reached a similar conclusion with respect to particular spectator sports.  Charles I. 
Schachter, Selfridge v. Carey:  The First Amendment’s Applicability to Sporting Events, 46 ALB. 
L. REV. 937, 977–78 (1982) (arguing that a particular rugby match satisfied the test for 
expressive conduct and deserved constitutional protection); Joshua A. Stein, Hitting Below 
the Belt:  Florida’s Taxation of Pay-Per-View Boxing Programming is a Content-Based Violation of 
the First Amendment, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 999, 1002 (2006) (“Boxing deserves the First Amend-
ment protections that have been granted to other physical, yet expressive, conduct.”).  
Others have reached the opposite conclusion.  Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty:  Freedom to 
Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2057 (2004) (asserting that 
the “free speech claims” of spectator sports like boxing and hockey “are tenuous”); Mi-
chael T. Morley, “Exceedingly Vexed and Difficult”:  Games and the First Amendment, 112 YALE 
L.J. 361, 368 (2002) (“It seems that athletes in only a few sports, such as diving, gymnas-
tics, and figure skating, are sufficiently close to being theatrical performers or dancers to 
merit constitutional protection.”).  For the most part, however, legal academics have 
simply ignored the question of the First Amendment status of sports themselves.  The 
bulk of the legal scholarship exploring First Amendment issues as they relate to sports has 
instead tended to focus on the constitutional status of activities associated with the play-
ing, watching, and business of sports rather than the games themselves.  See, e.g., Louis M. 
Benedict & John D. McMillen, Free Expression Versus Prohibited Speech:  The First Amendment 
and College Student Sports Fans, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 5 (2005) (examining the First 
Amendment rights of student sports fans); Christopher J. Kaufman, Unsportsmanlike Con-
duct:  15-Yard Penalty and Loss of Free Speech in Public University Sports Stadiums, 57 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1235 (2009) (examining the First Amendment rights of expression of spectators at 
university sporting events). 
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Amendment.  Today, nude dancing, begging, and making a movie or 
violent video game are all activities that trigger First Amendment 
scrutiny.11  Yet, playing football or baseball, or performing an artistic, 
non-team sport like gymnastics or figure skating, is not.  This means 
that watching sports, at least in person, is also not granted First 
Amendment protection, because audience rights typically derive 
from and depend upon the rights of performers.12 
This Article argues that the denial of free speech protection to 
spectator sports—that is, to sport performed in front of and with the 
intention of being seen by an audience—is wrong, both doctrinally 
and when considered in light of the aims and purposes of the First 
Amendment.  Doctrinally, it is wrong because games of spectator 
sports express, and effectively communicate, the “particularized 
messages” that the Supreme Court has held to be the prerequisite for 
constitutional protection.13  Philosophically, it is wrong because 
spectator sports contribute to the democratic public sphere in much 
the same way as do the other genres of mass entertainment that the 
First Amendment protects.  Like movies and other kinds of artistic 
entertainment, spectator sports not only entertain, they also help 
shape public attitudes and beliefs by providing audiences dramatic 
images of triumph and defeat, of virtue and excellence.  In this 
respect, sports demonstrate the tremendous influence that even 
lowbrow and highly commercialized genres of mass entertainment 
can have on democratic public attitudes and commitments.  The 
same justifications that led the Court to recognize movies and other 
forms of artistic entertainment as protected by the First Amendment 
thus apply also to spectator sports, despite the formal differences that 
distinguish artistic and athletic performances.  For this reason, the 
 
 11 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“[V]ideo games qualify for 
First Amendment protection.”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) 
(“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so.”); 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression by means of mo-
tion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 
1993) (holding that begging is expressive conduct because, although beggars do not 
transmit or express social or political messages, their presence, appearance, and conduct 
express their need for help). 
 12 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas fol-
lows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them[.]”). 
 13 See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether particular 
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into 
play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, 
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it.’” (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
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government should not be able to ban the performance of spectator 
sports, or the training such performance requires, because it dislikes 
the messages that the sport conveys.  While the popularity of sports 
like football and baseball works, as a kind of prophylactic against 
censorhip, the same is not true of all sports.  Less widely popular 
sports, such as boxing and mixed martial arts, remain vulnerable to 
efforts to prohibit their performance because of distaste for the vio-
lent and hyper-masculine messages they send.  This offends, or 
should be recognized to offend, the First Amendment as much as 
similar efforts to censor artistic or political performance do. 
What follows thus makes the case for recognizing spectator sports 
as expressive conduct, worthy of First Amendment protection.  Part I 
examines the exceptional status of spectator sports in First 
Amendment doctrine and the justifications that courts provide to 
explain them.  It argues that none of the justifications provide a 
satisfactory reason for denying spectator sports the First Amendment 
protection afforded all other genres of what we might call “audience-
oriented entertainment.” 
Part II examines what the social scientific literature on sports 
reveals about the expressiveness of athletic performance.  The case 
law dealing with the First Amendment status of sport has tended to 
ignore the extensive body of social scientific research examining the 
practice, and the cultural significance, of spectator sports in 
contemporary society.  This is problematic because it leaves courts at 
the mercy of their pretheoretical assumptions about the value and 
significance of spectator sports—assumptions that the scholarly 
literature suggests are simply wrong.  Indeed, when we turn to the 
social scientific literature, what we find is tremendous evidence that, 
rather than the relatively meaningless acts of entertainment that the 
case law makes them out to be, games of spectator sports are in fact 
dense symbolic performances—performances that communicate 
messages about, among other things, individual excellence and 
virtue, political identity, race, gender,  sexuality, and even beauty.  It 
is because of the ability of spectator sports to communicate these 
kinds of messages to their audiences that they possesses the cultural 
and political significance that they do, not only in the United States, 
but around the world. 
Part III argues that the rich evidence of sports’ expressiveness 
means that neither doctrine nor philosophy justifies denying First 
Amendment protection to spectator sports while extending it to 
other genres of mass entertainment such as movies, plays, and dance 
performances.  It argues that, in fact, there are no justifications for 
denying First Amendment protection to spectator sports.  Instead, 
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the denial of First Amendment protection to spectator sports only 
needlessly complicates the doctrine, by establishing an ultimately 
unjustifiable distinction between artistic and athletic expression and 
between live and televised athletic performance. 
I.  THE PROBLEM WITH SPORTS 
In his now-famous paean to the glories of baseball in Flood v. 
Kuhn, Justice Blackmun quoted a poem that had been published in 
the New York Herald Tribune in 1926.  The poem commented 
pungently on the relative importance of sports and literature in 
American popular culture at the time.  It noted that 
Ten million never heard of Keats, or Shelley, Burns or Poe; 
But they know “the air was shattered by the force of Casey’s blow”; 
They never heard of Shakespeare, nor of Dickens, like as not, 
But they know the somber drama from old Mudville’s haunted lot.14 
Eighty-five years later, the subtext of that poem—that sports play a 
far more vital role in American popular culture than does poetry or 
art—remains as true as when it was written.  It is sports, not art (or, as 
the poem suggests, when it is art, it is art about sports), that for many 
Americans provide the tragic and/or comedic narrative of their 
collective existence.  Americans spend hours every week watching 
sports on television; and for many, the sports pages are the first, 
perhaps only, section of the newspaper they read.  Sports metaphors 
pervade the American dialect; sports imagery pervades the American 
marketplace; and sports news and narratives pervade the American 
media.15  Sports thus provide many in the United States, as the sports 
historian Kathryn Jay notes, with a “central lens through which we 
view the world[.]”16 
Despite the importance of sports as a cultural institution—and 
despite Justice Blackmun’s explicit acknowledgement of this 
importance (at least with respect to baseball)—few courts have even 
hinted at the possibility that the act of participating in athletic 
competition might be a protected First Amendment activity.  Most 
instead conclude that sports games, even when performed in front of 
and with the intention of being seen by an audience, are not capable 
 
 14 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 263 n.4 (1972) (quoting Grantland Rice, He Never Heard of 
Casey, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., June 1, 1926, at 23). 
 15 DANIEL L. WANN, ET AL. SPORTS FANS:  THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF 
SPECTATORS 2, 13–17 (2001) (discussing the pervasiveness of sports as demonstrated 
through various media sources, including cinema, television, radio, print, and Internet). 
 16 JAY, supra note 8. 
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of conveying the kinds of “particularized message[s]” that the 
Supreme Court, in Spence v. Washington, held that nonlinguistic 
conduct must communicate in order to receive First Amendment 
protection.17  Courts find this to be true notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent clarification in Hurley v. Irish-American, Gay, Lesbi-
an and Bisexual Group that messages need not be “succinctly 
articulable” in order to merit First Amendment protection and, 
therefore, even such amorphous messages as those conveyed by the 
abstract “painting[s] of Jackson Pollock, . . . or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll” are “unquestionably shielded.”18  Even under this more 
relaxed articulation of the particularized message requirement, 
courts tend to reject First Amendment claims arising out of athletic 
performance either because they find that games do not reflect the 
requisite “intent to express a particularized message” that the first 
part of the Spence test for expressive conduct requires,19 or because 
they find that even when athletes do possess the requisite intent, the 
medium of the sports game is unable to communicate this message in 
a form in which the audience is likely to understand it.20 
What this means is that art and sport enjoy a very different status 
under the contemporary First Amendment.  Whereas art, including 
the nonpolitical abstract art and music referred to in Hurley, is gener-
ally considered high-value speech and therefore receives the same 
degree of protection as the expressly political speech that has histori-
cally been the primary concern of free speech jurisprudence, sports—
even spectator sports—usually receives no First Amendment protec-
tion whatsoever.  Although several courts have suggested that, under 
the right circumstances, the “exposition of an athletic exercise” might 
 
 17 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
 18 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 19 See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 374 (D. Ariz. 1983) (dismissing the First 
Amendment claim of college football players on the ground that college football, “like 
other sports, is primarily a conduct-oriented” rather than a “communicative” activity); 
Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1096 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (dismissing the 
First Amendment claim of a wrestling promoter on the grounds that “[t]he promotion of 
wrestling matches . . . is not a symbolic act, nor is the wrestling match itself a symbolic act” 
but instead constitutes a “purely entertainment pastime”). 
 20 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. 
Mo. 2002) (denying First Amendment protection to video games because, like baseball 
games, they fail to express any “ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to 
the game itself”); Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195–96 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(dismissing the First Amendment claim of amateur police boxers because “[w]hile we 
recognize that dance, when combined with nudity, can inexorably convey a message of 
eroticism . . . .  we are not convinced that a boxing match, in which police officers partic-
ipate, inexorably conveys any message other than that police officers can be pugilists”). 
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be entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection,21 in only 
two cases have courts actually struck down regulations of athletic 
competition on First Amendment grounds, and in neither case did 
the court squarely hold that sport was protected expression.22 
From a purely institutional perspective, this distinction between 
spectator sports and art is puzzling.  Like plays, concerts, ballets, and 
movies, spectator sports provide what we can call “audience-oriented 
entertainment.”  A football game, like a rock concert or art show, is 
an event that is performed in order to entertain and amuse an audi-
ence and that, in the absence of an audience, would not exist—or at 
least, would only exist in radically altered form.  (Think of the Super 
Bowl, for example, with nobody watching.)  Economically, as well, the 
spectator sports industry depends upon the willingness of spectators 
to watch its performances, just as the motion picture industry de-
pends upon the willingness of the public to buy tickets to shows. 
 
 21 Post Newsweek Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, 86 (D. Conn. 
1981) (asserting that the broadcast of a skating competition is protected speech, albeit 
“on the periphery of” First Amendment protection).  See also Maloney v. Cuomo, 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 205, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying First Amendment protection to the private, 
at home, practice of martial arts but recognizing that because the martial arts are histori-
cally and culturally significant to many, there could be circumstances in which an indi-
vidual’s practice of martial arts would merit First Amendment protection); Sunset 
Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of L.A., 496 P.2d 840, 845–46 (Cal. 1972) 
(“[N]o case has ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls within the ambit 
of the First Amendment, at least in the absence of some element of communicating or advancing 
ideas or beliefs.” (emphasis added)). 
 22 In the first case, the court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
enforcement of a village ordinance that made it unlawful “to play any games upon any 
street, alley, or sidewalk, or other public places except when a block party permit has 
been issued by the President and the Board of Trustees” because, inter alia, it found the 
statute overbroad in prohibiting even games performed with an expressly political intent. 
Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736–37 (N.D. Ill. 2000).  In the se-
cond case, a Maine district court held that a city parade regulation that exempted all 
“athletic events conducted by the Board of Education, Little League or other organiza-
tions” from the arduous registration requirements otherwise imposed on large-scale gath-
erings violated the First Amendment not by discriminating against certain kinds of speak-
ers on the basis of the content of their speech, but by placing burdensome restrictions on 
particular indigent groups while allowing other favored groups more freedom.  Sullivan v. 
City of Augusta, 406 F. Supp. 2d 92, 107–08, 114, 126 (D. Me. 2005), aff'd in part, vacated 
in part, rev'd in part, 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007).  The court acknowledged that other 
courts “have hesitated to declare that restraints on athletic activity violate the First 
Amendment” but concluded that, even if “pure athletic activities and games may not be 
protected by the First Amendment, free speech activities are quite foreseeable at the 
broader category of an athletic event.”  Id. at 107–08 n.13 (internal citations and quota-
tion marks omitted).  The court struck down the regulation, in other words, because of its 
discriminatory effect on the expressive rights of those who attended athletic and non-
athletic events, rather than because it found the athletic events themselves to be expres-
sive acts. 
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The explicit orientation of spectator sports toward an audience es-
tablishes a strong presumption that something expressive is taking 
place.  After all, why else would individuals address an audience if 
they did not wish to thereby communicate a message of some sort?  
And why would the audience pay good money to watch them if they 
received no messages from the act? 
In other contexts, courts have suggested that the presence of an 
audience orientation in fact establishes not only a presumption that 
something expressive is taking place but also may be dispositive of the 
expressiveness question altogether.  In Barnes v. Glen Theatre,23 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court extended protection to nude dancing de-
spite having denied protection only two years earlier, in City of Dallas 
v. Stanglin,24 to recreational ballroom dancers.  In his concurrence in 
Barnes, Justice Souter reconciled the two decisions by pointing to the 
presence, in the first case, and the absence, in the second case, of an 
audience-orientation. Souter argued, 
Not all dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection as expressive 
activity.  This Court has previously categorized ballroom dancing as be-
yond the Amendment’s protection . . . and dancing as aerobic exercise 
would likewise be outside the First Amendment’s concern.  But dancing 
as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience gives expression 
at least to generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude 
or nearly so the feeling expressed, in the absence of some contrary clue, 
is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic experience.25 
Two decades earlier, the California Supreme Court similarly sug-
gested that the presence or absence of an audience-performer rela-
tionship could be decisive in distinguishing protected from unpro-
tected conduct when it rejected a First Amendment challenge 
brought by owners of a Los Angeles roller skating rink to a city agen-
cy’s decision denying them a permit to continue operating the rink 
the following year.26  The plaintiffs claimed that the decision violated 
the free speech and assembly rights of their patrons.27  The court dis-
agreed because it found no evidence that those who skated at the 
rink intended their skating to be seen by others: 
[N]o case has ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls 
within the ambit of the First Amendment, at least in the absence of some 
element of communicating or advancing ideas or beliefs . . . . The key el-
ement is, of course, communication.  We have difficulty finding that essen-
 
 23 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991). 
 24 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). 
 25 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring)(emphasis added). 
26  Sunset Amusement, 496 P.2d at 843–44. 
 27 Id. at 845. 
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tial element to exist in the context of a roller skating rink.  True, it is in-
evitable that some patrons of the rink watch the other skaters and are, 
perhaps, entertained or amused by their activities.  And yet it seems ines-
capable that petitioners’ patrons primarily use the facilities for physical 
exercise and personal pleasure; [the] element of communication be-
tween an artist or performer and his audience seems entirely lacking.28 
Although not stated as explicitly elsewhere, the idea that it is the 
presence of an audience-performer relationship that distinguishes 
expressive conduct from that which is not expressive informs, and 
helps make sense of, much of the First Amendment case law dealing 
with art and entertainment.  This idea explains, for example, why—
when confronted with an activity involving an audience-performer re-
lationship—courts tend to extend First Amendment protection with-
out requiring first any proof that the conduct actually satisfies both 
elements of the Spence test for expressive conduct.29  This is notwith-
standing the general recognition that, in theory, the Spence principles 
apply to art and entertainment, as to other forms of non-linguistic 
expression.30  The audience-orientation appears to obviate any need 
to demonstrate that the actor, dancer, or musician actually intended 
to convey a particularized message to the audience, or that this mes-
sage was, in the circumstances in which it was expressed, likely to be 
understood. 
Courts’ willingness to extend First Amendment protection to all 
activities that involve a recognizable performer-audience relationship 
means that today, the category of spectator sports is the only genre of 
audience-oriented entertainment that is not categorically protected 
by the First Amendment.  There are a number of other popular gen-
res of entertainment that are also denied First Amendment protec-
 
 28 Id. at 845–46. 
 29 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (extending categorical 
First Amendment protection to musical performance without invoking the Spence test); 
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975) (recognizing live theatre as 
protected speech without requiring any evidence that actors intended to convey particu-
larized messages or that these messages were likely to be understood, as required by the 
Spence test); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1477 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(“Films, plays, and even ‘crude street skits’ constitute inherently expressive communica-
tive vehicles and, as such, warrant First Amendment protection even if the speaker cannot 
establish an intent to convey a particularized message.”).  See also Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! 
Girls!:  The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1114 n.19 (2005) 
(noting that, when deciding whether nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, the Supreme Court “[o]ddly” did not invoke the Spence test in either Barnes or a 
subsequent case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)). 
 30 Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (in-
terpreting the “particularized message” requirement in Spence as not requiring linquistic 
expression in light of the extension of First Amendment protection to art). 
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tion.  Gambling, for example, is generally not considered expressive 
activity.31  Nor is recreational dancing, as Stanglin made clear.32  How-
ever, these activities typically do not involve the kind of audience-
performer relationship that characterizes movies and musical per-
formances, and all of the other kinds of art and entertainment that 
the First Amendment protects.  Spectator sports do involve an audi-
ence-performer relationship, but nevertheless are generally denied 
any recognition as expressive activity.  This makes its status under the 
First Amendment an exceptional one.  As such, it raises as an obvious 
question, namely, what it is about spectator sports that make them—
or that makes courts perceive them to be—inexpressive in a way that 
all other genres of audience-oriented entertainment are not. 
The sports case law provides little assistance in answering this 
question.  Courts provide generally three explanations for the denial 
of First Amendment protection to spectator sports, but none provide 
an ultimately convincing explanation of the distinction between 
sports and art. 
Some courts argue that games of spectator sports are not expres-
sive acts because those who take part in them do not do so in order to 
communicate any ideas or information to their audiences.  A Florida 
district court made this argument to justify its dismissal of a wrestling 
promoter’s First Amendment challenge to a city lease agreement that 
granted his competitor exclusive access to the only facility in town 
capable of hosting public wrestling matches.33  The promoter argued 
that the lease agreement violated his First Amendment rights by pre-
venting him from expressing himself through the promotion of the 
wrestling matches.34  The court disagreed because it found no evi-
dence that the promoter intended to use the matches as a vehicle for 
advancing his own political or social views, or for allowing the wres-
tlers to advance their own.35  The court pointed to a colloquy between 
the plaintiff and defense counsel in which the plaintiff admitted that 
 
 31 See, e.g., Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454–55 (D.R.I. 1985) aff'd, 
788 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that playing and conduct-
ing Bingo games is a form of expression and association that is protected by the First 
Amendment); United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (“The First 
Amendment is not applicable where criminal conduct is involved.”). 
32 See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25 (“The Dallas ordinance restricts attendance at Class E dance 
halls. . . . These opportunities . . . simply do not involve the sort of expressive association 
that the First Amendment has been held to protect.”) 
 33 Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1094–95 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (emphasiz-
ing that wrestlers do not participate in wrestling matches for the purpose of publibly ex-
pressing political statements or philosophies or addressing the public through speeches). 
34  Id. at 1096. 
 35 Id.  
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he did not intend to make his wrestlers “stop wrestling and make 
speeches to the crowd” and concluded that 
There can be no serious contention, and none has been advanced by 
plaintiff, that . . . wrestling is an activity “akin to free speech” as that 
phrase was used in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District . . . . [to 
refer to] the symbolic act of wearing politically significant armbands to 
protest the Vietnam war . . . . This case does not involve a speech by a 
public figure or anything of that nature, but only concerns the right to 
promote wrestling, a purely entertainment pastime.  There is no evi-
dence which could conceivably support the idea that the promotion of 
professional wrestling involves speech or symbolic acts equivalent to 
speech . . . .36 
The court concluded, in other words, that wrestling constituted a 
“purely entertainment pastime,” rather than “speech or symbolic 
acts,” because it was not intended to convey political messages like 
those the schoolchildren in Tinker intended to convey by wearing 
black armbands to school.  In 1982, a New York district court similarly 
concluded that baseball games do not deserve First Amendment pro-
tection because they provide “pure entertainment with no informa-
tional element.”37 
Other courts argue that there is something inherent in the nature 
of athletic performance that distinguishes sport from art.  A New York 
district court, for example, accepted, for purposes of argument, that 
members of an amateur police boxing team took part in public box-
ing matches because they wanted to convey the “particularized mes-
sage” that they were “individuals of character pursuing excellence 
and adhering to ethical standards of fair play and sportsman-
ship . . . .”38  It nevertheless concluded that whatever messages the 
boxers intended to convey via their performance in the ring would 
not be likely be understood by their audiences.  “While we recognize 
that dance, when combined with nudity, can inexorably convey a 
message of eroticism,” the court wrote, “we are not convinced that a 
boxing match, in which police officers participate, inexorably conveys 
any message other than that police officers can be pugilists.”39  An Ar-
izona district court made a similar distinction between sport and art 
when it called college football a “conduct-oriented activity” and on 
this basis distinguished it from the more “communicative” genres of 
artistic performance, such as jazz music and nude dance, which were 
 
 36 Id. at 1095–96. 
 37 America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dep’t of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 
170, 174 (E.D.N.Y 1982). 
 38 Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 898 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 39 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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entitled to First Amendment protection.40  The court did not explain 
what it is about college football that makes it, unlike jazz music or 
nude dancing, insufficiently communicative to justify First Amend-
ment protection.  One could speculate, however, that it has some-
thing to do with the violence and physicality of the sport when com-
pared to the more obviously aesthetic orientation of music and 
dance.41  Alternatively, it may have something to do with the fact that 
football is a competitive activity, whereas jazz music and dance are 
not. 
This distinction is what underpins the third, and perhaps most 
persuasive, justification courts provide for denying First Amendment 
protection to sport:  namely, that because sport typically involves 
competition, it is incapable of expressing the kinds of messages that 
the First Amendment protects.  A Missouri district court made this 
argument, for example, in Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. 
Louis County, to explain why neither baseball nor baseball video 
games are entitled to First Amendment protection.  The court wrote 
[T]he game of baseball is not a form of expression entitled to free 
speech protection.  It is often times surrounded by speech and expressive 
ideas—music between innings, fans carrying signs with expressive mes-
sages—however, these expressive elements do not transform the game of 
baseball into “speech.”  Rather it remains, just what it is—a game.  Nor 
does the Court think there is some magical transformation when this 
game of baseball appears in video form.  The objectives are still the 
same—to score runs—and the only difference is a player pushes a button 
or swings a “computer bat,” rather than swinging a wooden 
bat . . . . [T]he Court fails to see how video games express ideas, impres-
sions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself. 42 
The court suggests here that it is because those who play baseball 
do so with the objective of winning the game—rather than for some 
other, presumably more expressive reason—they fail to communicate 
by their performance in the game any messages, or at least any mes-
sages that the First Amendment protects, even when the performance 
itself is surrounded by other kinds of expressive activity (fans waving 
signs, music before and in the middle of the game, etc.). 
 
 40 Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 374 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
 41 Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that while First Amendment protection 
should be denied to sports such as football and wrestling, it should be extended to other 
sports—ice skating, gymnastics, diving—which more closely resemble music and dance 
and in which athletes’ participation is guided by more self-evidently aesthetic concerns.  
Morley, supra note 10, at 368. 
 42 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. Mo. 
2002). 
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In a 2002 article in the Yale Law Journal, Michael T. Morley simi-
larly argued that the fact that they involve competition means that 
most sports do not deserve First Amendment protection, notwith-
standing the “inconsisten[cy]” created by “deny[ing] constitutional 
protection to sporting events, while extending it to other forms of live 
entertainment performed before audiences.”43  The fact that sport in-
volves competition, Morley argued, means that “unlike most theatri-
cal performances, just about everything an athlete does can be ex-
plained by something other than an attempt to convey an idea to the 
audience.”44  It also means that, when athletes participate in spectator 
sports, their performance is primarily guided by “functional, non-
expressive concerns such as catching a pass or kicking a goal.”45  For 
this reason, he concluded that the only spectator sports that deserve 
First Amendment protection are those in which the competition itself 
depends upon the ability of the athletes to effectively express messag-
es of grace and beauty through their performance.  In these sports 
only, Morley suggests, the fact of competition will not blur or under-
mine the expressive desires that athletes may bring to the sport.46 
None of these arguments provide a persuasive explanation for 
why art is entitled to First Amendment protection but spectator sport 
is not.  The first idea—that spectator sports are not expressive acts 
because they function to entertain rather than to educate or politi-
cize—is deeply unsatisfying as a justification for denying free speech 
protection to spectator sports, given the extension of First Amend-
ment protection to other genres of expression—movies, music, 
dance, even video games—that similarly function primarily to enter-
tain.  Indeed, the First Amendment protects more than merely the 
“exposition of ideas,” as the Supreme Court noted over fifty years 
ago, in Winters v. New York, when it struck down the conviction of a 
bookseller convicted of selling magazines “principally made up 
of . . . stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime” and disavowed any 
attempt to distinguish between protected and unprotected expres-
sion on the basis of whether it educates or merely entertains.47  “The 
line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive,” the 
Court stated, “for the protection of that basic right [of a free press].  
 
 43 Morley, supra note 10, at 367. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 368. 
 46 Id. (suggesting that athletes in sports such as ice skating, gymnastics, and diving are enti-
tled to protection under the First Amendment because these sports are “permeate[d]” 
with creative, artistic expression rather than being “primarily controlled by functional, 
nonexpressive concerns”).  
 47 333 U.S. 507, 508, 510 (1948). 
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Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.  
What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”48  Be-
cause it recognized that even non-political and non-didactic expres-
sion can have a political effect on its audience’s beliefs and opinions, 
the Court refused to sustain the prosecution of even vulgar literature 
like the true crime magazines and, in subsequent decades, extended 
First Amendment protection to many other kinds of merely enter-
taining speech.49  It cannot, therefore, simply be the fact that athletes 
do not communicate in speeches, or seek by their performance to 
advance a particular set of social or political ideas that precludes First 
Amendment protection because the same would obviously be true of 
many varieties of non-political art and entertainment that the Court, 
in the decades since Winters, has recognized to be “unquestionably” 
protected by the First Amendment.50 
The second idea—that there is something inherent in athletic ac-
tivity that renders it inexpressive—is also unpersuasive as a justifica-
tion for the denial of First Amendment protection to sport.  Under 
Spence, it is not the form of the activity but instead the context in 
which it takes place and the intent with which it is performed that de-
termines its status under the First Amendment.  Hence, activities that 
share many of the same formal properties may possess a very different 
constitutional status.  For example, recreational ballroom dancing 
and nude dancing share many of the same formal properties.  Never-
theless, only nude dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection 
because—as Justice Daniel Souter noted in his Barnes concurrence51—
it is only nude dancing that is addressed to, and performed in front 
of, an audience.  Without more elaboration of what it is about the 
context in which, or the intent with which, boxing matches—or foot-
ball games—are performed, this justification for denying those who 
participate in these games First Amendment protection is deeply un-
satisfying. 
Nor can the distinction between art and sport be justified on the 
basis of their purportedly aesthetic versus non-aesthetic orientations.  
 
 48 Id. at 510. 
49 See supra note 29. 
 50 Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(“[I]f confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ . . . [constitutional 
protection] would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, 
music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” (internal citation 
omitted)); see Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 170, 
188 (2012) (noting that art receives First Amendment protection notwithstanding the ab-
sence, in many cases, of any intent by the artist to communicate ideas). 
51  Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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For one thing, it is not at all clear that athletes, even in non-aesthetic 
sports such as boxing and baseball, do not seek by their performance 
in the ring or on the field to communicate messages of grace and 
beauty.52  Even assuming for purposes of argument that they do not, 
there is nothing in the case law that suggests that messages of beauty 
are the only kinds of messages to which constitutional protection ex-
tends.  To the contrary, it is a fundamental principle of the First 
Amendment that, except with respect to a few limited categories of 
speech, the guarantee of freedom of expression applies equally to all 
speakers, irrespective of the content of their speech.53  The fact that 
athletes and others associated with spectator sports may not inten-
tionally communicate by their performance on the field the kinds of 
aesthetic messages that dancers or musicians communicate does not 
justify denying them First Amendment protection if they communi-
cate other kinds of messages (as I argue in the next Part that they 
do). 
The third idea, that spectator sports are not entitled to First 
Amendment protection because they involve competitive activity is 
also not ultimately persuasive as an explanation of the difference in 
the constitutional status afforded sport and art.  Intuitively, the ar-
gument has a great deal of appeal.  It identifies what appears to be a 
fundamentally distinguishing feature of sport and the artistic genres 
of entertainment that the First Amendment protects.  Art does not, 
after all, tend to be organized as a competition, whereas sport is by 
definition competitive.54  This fact in turn has important implications 
 
 52 See infra notes 76–78 (demonstrating examples of purposes that some athletes may have 
and messages that they may seek to communicate through their athletic performances). 
 53 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’”) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 818 (2000) (“[E]sthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the 
individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approv-
al of a majority.”). 
 54 There is some debate about how to define sport and, specifically, whether the term refers 
to all “competitive, rule-governed activity that human beings freely choose to engage 
[in],” or only to competitive activities that require physical exertion on the part of the 
competitors.  Compare CRAIG CLIFFORD & RANDOLPH FEEZELL, COACHING FOR CHARACTER:  
RECLAIMING THE PRINCIPLES OF SPORTSMANSHIP, 11 (1997) with JAY COAKLEY, SPORTS IN 
SOCIETY 21 (2006) (defining sports as “institutionalized competitive activities that involve 
rigorous physical exertion or the use of relatively complex physical skills by participants 
motivated by internal and external rewards.”).  What neither side of the debate disputes, 
however, is that sport involves competition.  Cf. Sport Definition MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sport (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014) (defining sport as “a contest or game in which people do certain physical activities 
according to a specific set of rules and compete against each other”). 
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for how the different kinds of performances operate.  A football 
game will be structured very differently than a ballet performance, for 
example, and this is not simply because in one performance the per-
formers dance and in another performance they hit one another and 
run and catch balls.  Instead, it is because, in one performance, the 
dynamism of the performance derives from the competitive struggle 
of the players to win, and in the other it does not.  We experience the 
two performances differently, as a result.  We might call a really excit-
ing football game a nail-biter, for example, but we would never de-
scribe an exciting ballet in this way.  This is because we watch the 
football game in order to see who wins the competition, whereas this 
is not why we watch a ballet, nor a reason to give it praise. 
The fact that sport involves competition and art typically does not 
thus helps explain many of the formal differences between sport and 
art as genres of performance.  It also may affect our judgment about 
the relative cultural value that the two genres of activity possess.55  
What that fact does not do, however, is justify the legal conclusion 
that courts draw from it:  namely, that sport, and other competitive 
activities, are not entitled to First Amendment protection even when 
performed before, and addressed to, an audience.  This is because, 
under Spence, the form that an activity takes is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether the First Amendment applies.  
Instead, the only question that matters constitutionally is whether 
games of spectator sports convey particularized messages that audi-
ences can understand.  This is an empirical question, but one courts 
have not turned to the empirical, or even the popular, writing on 
sports to address.  This is problematic, because when we do turn to 
the relatively extensive body of social scientific literature on sports, 
what becomes clear is that the empirical assumptions that underpin 
the courts rely on are wrong.  It is simply not the case that, because 
 
 55 The philosopher Graham Gordon argues, for example, that one of the implications of 
the formal differences between sport and art is that, while there may be “sporting equiva-
lents” of great artistic performers, such as the opera singer Maria Callas and the actor, 
Lawrence Olivier—he suggests, as equivalents for these figures, the tennis player, Martina 
Navratilova, and the boxer, Muhammed Ali, respectively—there will be “no sporting 
equivalents of Shakespeare and Mozart.”  GORDON GRAHAM, PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARTS:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO AESTHETICS 27–28 (2005).  This leads him to conclude that, while 
sport may be a tremendously important and creative human endeavor, it is nevertheless 
of lesser cultural significance than the arts.  Id. at 28.  Other philosophers, however, disa-
gree.  For a strong articulation of an opposing point of view, see Peter J. Arnold, Sport, the 
Aesthetic and Art:  Further Thoughts, 38 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUDIES 160 (1990) (arguing that 
some sports have aesthetic significance and merit and that all sports can usually be classi-
fied as either non-aesthetic or partially aesthetic while some sports may be correctly classi-
fied as art). 
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athletes play games in order to win them, they neither intend nor are 
capable of communicating, by their performance in the game, any 
messages worth protecting.  To the contrary, as the social scientific 
literature on sports demonstrates, it is in many respects because sport 
involves competition that games possess the important cultural, even 
sometimes political, significance that they do—as the next Part ex-
plores. 
 II:  SPORT AS AN EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY 
Under Spence, two things must be true for games of spectator 
sports to merit the protection of the First Amendment.  First, indi-
viduals associated with the performance of the game—be they ath-
letes, coaches, promoters, funders, or the like—must seek to convey, 
by their participation in the event, particularized, even if not suc-
cinctly articulable, messages.56  Second, the messages that athletes, 
coaches, promoters and the like seek to convey through their partici-
pation in the activity must be likely to be understood by the audience 
watching the game.57  The particularized messages that games express 
must, in other words, be not only intended, but intelligible. 
This is in some respects a high bar, and in some respects a low 
one.  On the one hand, the fact that, under Spence, an expressive act 
must be both intentional and intelligible excludes from constitution-
al protection many things that we may find entertaining or meaning-
ful to watch but that are not the product of an expressive intention.  
As Judge Posner noted in Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, a display of 
the northern lights might be both entertaining and personally mean-
ingful to those who watch it, but under Spence it would not qualify as 
constitutionally protected because it would not reflect the right kind 
of expressive intent.58  Spence also fails to protect idiosyncratic expres-
sion that an audience is unlikely to understand, no matter how deep-
ly an individual may intend to convey it.59 
 
56  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).  
57  Id. at 415. 
 58 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concur-
ring) (“Anything that gives pleasure can be counted as entertainment, yet not everything 
that gives pleasure is expressive.  I might find a display of northern lights entertaining; 
this would not make that display an expressive activity.”). 
 59 Hence the Second Circuit dismissed a First Amendment challenge to a county regulation 
that prohibited van drivers from wearing skirts while on duty because it found that, even 
if the plaintiff sought to communicate a “deeply held cultural value” by the wearing of a 
skirt, this message was unlikely to be understood by those who saw her wearing it.  
Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 318–20 (2d Cir. 2003).  The Third Cir-
cuit dismissed, for similar reasons, a corrections officer’s challenge to a regulation that 
 
1126 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
On the other hand, Spence establishes no limits on the kinds of 
messages that expressive conduct may communicate.  Nor does the 
test restrict in any way the form in which these messages may be con-
veyed.  Instead, as Robert Post argues, because the Spence test focuses 
solely on the speaker’s intent, the message, and the likelihood that an 
audience will understand that message, and pays no attention to the 
social context in which the conduct takes place or the values that it 
fosters, the test in principle extends free speech protection to acts 
that, in practice, courts will be very unwilling to recognize as protect-
ed speech, given their preexisting commitments to the norms and 
purposes of the First Amendment.60  Post cites as an example of this 
phenomenon a racially motivated hate crime that successfully com-
municates a message of racial prejudice.61 
One can see hints of a similar phenomenon in the sports case law, 
and specifically in courts’ unwillingness to even consider the possibil-
ity that the messages that surely all sports games send—namely, mes-
sages about the outcome and progress of the game—might be suffi-
cient to entitle spectator sports to First Amendment protection.  In 
theory, it is difficult to understand why these messages do not satisfy 
the two elements of the Spence test.  The message, for example, that 
“Team A won,” seems very directly a reflection of the arduous efforts 
of Team A to communicate, by its performance in the game, this 
message.  It also seems unlikely that a clear and explicit message of 
this sort would not be intelligible to the audience to the game.  Yet, 
courts refuse to extend protection to spectator sports on the basis of 
messages of this kind.  The Interactive Digital Software Ass’n court made 
this clear when it acknowledged that video games might communi-
cate to their audiences messages “[]related to the game itself”—that 
is, messages that relate to the outcome and progress of the competi-
 
required him to wear a flag patch on his uniform.  Since the court found it unlikely that 
the flag patch would “relay any message (ideological or otherwise) to anyone,” the court 
concluded that the regulation raised no issue of compelled speech.  Troster v. Pa. State 
Dep’t. of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 60 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1995) 
(pointing out that the Spence test’s flawed, limited focus on “a speaker’s intent, a specific 
message, and an audience’s potential reception of that message” theoretically brings in-
stances of defacement of public property under the protection of the First Amendment 
even though no courts would permit such an outcome). 
 61 Id. (“Think of the racist who commits a violent crime successfully to communicate a mes-
sage of racial prejudice and hate.  In such a case we do not say that the state’s interest in 
prohibiting violence outweighs the defendant’s interest in communication, but rather 
that the First Amendment does not come into the case at all.” (internal citation omit-
ted)).  
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tion—but nevertheless denied that sport constitutes a “form of ex-
pression entitled to free speech protection.”62 
This refusal to entertain the possibility that messages of this sort 
are sufficient to trigger First Amendment protection may reflect 
courts’ commitment to their conception of the normative values of 
the First Amendment.  As Part III explores, the First Amendment has 
traditionally been interpreted to protect, above all, speech on matters 
of public concern—that is, speech that relates, in some fashion, to 
questions of social or political order or meaning.  Messages that re-
late solely to the outcome or progress of a formal contest like a game 
may simply be too far removed from this core concern to justify con-
stitutional protection.  Even if we take into account this limitation, 
however, and consider as grounds for extending First Amendment 
protection to sport only messages that relate in some fashion to the 
larger concerns of the social and political world, what the social sci-
entific sports literature makes abundantly clear is that even non-
aesthetic sports satisfy both Spence’s intent and intelligibility require-
ments. 
A.  The Expressive Intent of Athletes and Others 
First, it is not true, as the Interactive Software Digital Ass’n court as-
sumed, that because athletes are motivated to take part in games of 
spectator sports by the non-expressive desire to win they are not also 
motivated by other, more properly expressive desires.  In fact, there is 
considerable evidence that athletes take part in public competition 
not only because they want to win but also because they want to show 
that they can win.  Sports journalism is replete, for example, with in-
stances of athletes vowing to put on a good show or to show what they 
can do.63  Indeed, like the professional entertainers to whom they are 
frequently compared, professional athletes can earn tremendous 
fame and money by putting on a good show.  Michael Jordan’s excep-
tional performances on the basketball court, for example, “not only 
transformed the game of basketball” but also turned Jordan into a 
 
 62 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (E.D. 
Mo. 2002). 
 63 See, e.g., Rick Maese, Donte Stallworth:  ‘I just want to show what I can do’ with Redskins, 
WASHINGTON POST SPORTS INSIDER BLOG (July 27, 2011, 10:37 AM ET), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/football-insider/post/donte-stallworth-i-just-
want-to-show-what-i-can-do-with-redskins/2011/07/27/gIQA1CjrcI_blog.html; Ian Thom-
sen, 1 Cleveland Cavaliers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 26, 2009, at 80 (Anthony Parker stat-
ing that “[he] was given an opportunity to show what [he] can do” in the NBA). 
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“global superstar, celebrity figure and commercial brand.”64  Other 
sports stars earn tens of millions of dollars each year in salary and en-
dorsement deals; like actors and other kinds of entertainers, their 
skill as performers can make them not only extremely rich but fa-
mous on an almost global scale.65  In this respect, athletes are like 
other kinds of performing artists, whose career success depends upon 
the excitement and interest they generate by their performance. 
Athletes take part in spectator sports not only for fame, but also 
for glory.  The link between athletic performance and glory is an old 
and well-established one.  In ancient Greece, for example, participa-
tion in public athletics was considered a “deadly serious [means] to 
attract glory to one’s name and honour to oneself and family”66 and 
to “establish social status and individual preeminence . . . .]”67  Ath-
letes did so by showing “especial skill and excellence” on the playing 
field, thereby demonstrating the manly virtues associated with both 
sport and war.68  Notwithstanding the significant differences between 
contemporary and ancient athletics and contemporary United States 
and ancient Greece, the sports literature suggests that athletes con-
tinue to take part in public athletic competition for glory. In other 
words, they want to demonstrate to an audience their “especial skill 
and excellence” on the playing field—and the moral (and often still, 
“manly”) virtues it takes to acquire and to perform those skills—and 
in so doing earn the praise, honor, and validation of those who watch 
them play. 
Sport provides an excellent venue for the demonstration of these 
virtues because of its formalism.  The simplicity and transparency of 
the rules that govern athletic competition, and the fact that when in-
dividuals compete on the playing field, they do so from a position of 
equality, lends games an appearance of fairness that may be missing 
from ordinary social life, where individuals compete armed with high-
ly unequal materials and social resources and according to a com-
plex, and in many cases, highly ambiguous, set of rules.  It also cre-
ates the impression that athletic victory is a consequence of the skill 
of the players—and the skill of the players alone.  It is because, as Mi-
 
 64 BARRY SMART, THE SPORT STAR:  MODERN SPORT AND THE CULTURAL ECONOMY OF 
SPORTING CELEBRITY 10 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 65 Id. at 78 (noting Tiger Woods’s forty million dollar endorsement contract with Nike and 
LeBron James’s ninety million dollar sponsorship contract with Nike, among others); id. 
at 144–90 (discussing the cultural phenomenon of the global sports star as represented in 
the figures of David Beckham and Anna Kournikova). 
 66 MIKE MCNAMEE, SPORTS, VIRTUES AND VICES:  MORALITY PLAYS 16 (2008). 
 67 DONALD G. KYLE, SPORT AND SPECTACLE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 7 (2007). 
 68 Id. 
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chael Mandelbaum puts it, “[e]very game begins with the teams equal 
on the dimension that matters most:  The score is always zero to zero.  
The outcome of each game [appears to] depend . . . entirely on what 
the players do during the contest[,]” so “sports . . . express the prin-
ciple of merit.”69 
In practice, of course, sports games do not provide as even of a 
playing field as they appear.  Economic inequalities impact which 
players and which teams win the games, and racial and gender ine-
qualities have in the past, and continue to some degree today, to bar 
certain kinds of individuals from the field.70  Nevertheless, the idea 
that what is displayed on the field of athletic competition is individual 
excellence, freed from social and political constraints and inequali-
ties, continues to attract athletes to sports.  Indeed, sociological stud-
ies of athletes in a variety of sports suggest that one of the most im-
portant reasons why individuals choose to take part in public 
competition is because of the opportunity it gives them to demon-
strate that they possess the physical and psychological virtues associ-
ated with success in that sport. 
In a recent study of professional prizefighters on the South Side of 
Chicago, the sociologist Loïc Wacquant noted, for example, that one 
of the primary reasons the men he studied chose the physically dan-
gerous and financially uncertain profession of prizefighting was be-
cause of the opportunity it gave them to “publicly establish . . . [their] 
fortitude and valor.”71  By boxing well, fighters demonstrated that 
they possessed the “virile values” commonly associated with success in 
boxing, “such as hardness, pugnacity, and physical bravery.”72  At the 
same time, by appearing fit and well-prepared for their fights, boxers 
showed that they possessed the self-discipline and commitment that it 
 
 69 MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE MEANING OF SPORTS:  WHY AMERICANS WATCH BASEBALL, 
FOOTBALL, AND BASKETBALL AND WHAT THEY SEE WHEN THEY DO 20–21 (2004). 
Mandelbaum makes this claim specifically about team sports, but the same is true of indi-
vidual sports as well. 
 70 For more discussion of these points, see D. Stanley Eitzen, Upward Mobility Through Sport?  
The Myths and Realities, in SPORT IN CONTEMP. SOC’Y 249, 249 (D. Stanley Eitzen ed., 7th 
ed. 2005) (noting that “[t]ypically, Americans believe that sport is a path to upward mo-
bility” but questioning the truth of this assumption); JOHN HOBERMAN, DARWIN’S 
ATHLETES:  HOW SPORT HAS DAMAGED BLACK AMERICA AND PRESERVED THE MYTH OF RACE 
(1997) (critiquing the myth of sport as a space of equal opportunity and a mechanism for 
racial integration); Robert E. Washington and David Karen, Sport and Society, 27 ANN. REV. 
SOCIOL. 187 (2001) (reviewing the literature exploring the racial, gender, and class ineq-
uities involved in professional sports). 
 71 Loïc J. D. Wacquant, The Pugilistic Point of View:  How Boxers Think and Feel about Their 
Trade, 24 THEORY & SOC’Y 489, 513 (1995). 
 72 Id. at 505. 
1130 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
took to stick to the arduous training regimen and ascetic lifestyle that 
success as a boxer was believed to require.73  They boxed, in other 
words, for expressive reasons:  because they wanted to demonstrate to 
the watching crowd that they were “m[e]n of strength” as well as 
“m[e]n of virtue” and thereby earn its admiration and respect.74 
Studies of athletes in other sports suggest they also participate in 
public competition in order to demonstrate their virtue and their 
valor.  In an article examining the phenomenon of pickup or 
“schoolyard” basketball, Jeff Greenfield noted, for example, that 
many kids in the inner city played basketball because it provided 
them a perhaps unique opportunity to demonstrate, both to the oth-
er players and to those who might watch the game, their manliness 
and value: 
For many young men in the slums . . . the school yard is the only place 
they can feel true pride in what they do, where can move free of inhibi-
tions and where they can, by being spectacular, rise for a moment against 
the drabness and anonymity of their lives.  Thus, when a player develops 
extraordinary ‘school yard’ moves and shots . . . [they] become his meas-
ure as a man.  So the moves that begin as tactics for scoring soon become 
calling cards.  You don’t just lay the ball in for an uncontested basket; 
you take the ball in both hands, leap as high as you can and slam the ball 
through the hoop.  When you jump in the air, fake a shot, bring the ball 
back to your body, and throw up a shot, all without coming back down, 
you have proven your worth in uncontestable fashion.75 
Subsequent studies have found that basketball players who play 
the game in more formal arenas similarly compete to demonstrate 
their manliness by demonstrating on the court, particular gendered 
virtues, such as aggression, creativity, and physical strength.  Hence, a 
recent study of African-American college basketball players found 
that they considered the basketball court a prime location in which to 
“flaunt their manhood” by demonstrating that they had game.76 
 
 73 Id. at 513 (noting “the homology set up in and by the ring between physical excellence 
and moral standing,” its dependence on the idea that success in the ring “hinges on the 
adoption of proper personal habits and conduct outside of it,” and that it was widely be-
lieved among boxers that “an ordinary boxer who conscientiously abides by the com-
mandments of the pugilistic catechism, as they apply in particular to nutrition, social life, 
and sexual activity, stands every chance of toppling a more talented but dissipated 
foe . . . .”) 
 74 Id.  
 75 Jeff Greenfield, The Black and White Truth About Basketball, in SIGNIFYIN(G), SANCTIFYIN’, 
AND SLAM DUNKING 375 (Gena Caponi ed., 1999) (citation omitted). 
 76 Shaun R. Harper, The Measure of a Man:  Conceptualizations of Masculinity Among High-
Achieving African American Male College Students, 48 BERKELEY J. SOCIOLOGY 89, 97–98 
(2004). 
Apr. 2014] SPORT AS SPEECH 1131 
 
A recent study of middle-class practitioners of the sport of mixed 
martial arts (“MMA”) found that these athletes also participated in 
public fights because they wished to demonstrate their mental and 
physical virtues.77  By remaining “steady in the face of [the] sudden 
pressure [of the fight],” the researchers noted, “fighters show them-
selves and their peers who they really are by reaffirming collectively 
recognized virtues such as gameness, heart, courage, and asceti-
cism.”78  It was because of the opportunity it provided to demonstrate 
these valued qualities that fighters believed cage fighting accom-
plished things that no amount of training could.  As the researchers 
note,  “Fighters believe training in the gym is about becoming the 
sort of person you want to be, and fighting in front of an audience is 
about revealing who you are and who you have become, both to your-
self and to everyone watching.”79  A survey of professional, college, 
and amateur male athletes in a wide variety of sports similarly con-
cluded that, for many of the athletes surveyed, their performance on 
the sports field, and the relationship they established with the crowd 
during the game, was “the most emotionally salient relationship 
through which their positional identities [were] constructed and af-
firmed.”80  In other words, for these athletes also, it was on the playing 
field that they showed who they were and what they were made of. 
It is not the case, therefore, that because athletes play games to 
win them, they are not motivated by other, more properly expressive 
ends.  What the studies quoted above suggest, in fact, is that it may be 
difficult in many cases to distinguish an athlete’s competitive motiva-
tions from his or her expressive desires:  that athletes play spectator 
sports because they want to demonstrate by winning, or at least by 
struggling valiantly to win, that they possess the particular physical 
and psychological virtues associated with success in that sport and 
that they thereby deserve the audience’s admiration and respect, its 
honor, and its glory. 
Nor is it only athletes who seek to communicate particularized 
messages through their participation in spectator sports.  Those who 
fund and promote spectator sports also do so, in many cases, for ex-
pressive ends.  National governments, for example, provide both 
economic and non-economic support to local teams or sports pro-
 
 77 Corey M. Abramson & Darren Modzelewski, Caged Morality:  Moral Worlds, Subculture, and 
Stratification Among Middle-Class Cage-Fighters, 34 QUALITATIVE SOCIOL. 143, 165–66 (2011). 
 78 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 79 Id. at 166. 
 80 MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY:  SPORTS AND THE PROBLEM OF MASCULINITY 50 
(1992). 
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grams to ensure that when athletes compete in international compe-
titions, they demonstrate through their performance the strength 
and power of the political community they represent or with whom 
they are associated.  As James Frey and Stanley Eitzen note,  “[S]tatus 
in the community of nations is ultimately related to success in athletic 
events.  The gold medal count in the Olympics is important precisely 
because that count becomes a measure of political legitimacy, of 
modernization, or of a people’s resolve.”81  Municipal governments 
support local teams for many of the same reasons.  Michael Danielson 
notes, for example, that in the United States, “[a]lmost every stadium 
and most arenas built over the past half century have been financed 
with public funds; and these facilities have been offered to teams un-
der ever more favorable terms.”82  Governments support local 
teams—and provide generous financial incentives to ensure they stay 
local—because of the boost not only to tourism and tax revenues but 
also to the city’s image and sense of well-being, associated with a suc-
cessful local sports franchise.83  This is an expressive desire—albeit a 
risky one.  Danielson notes, for example, that “Cleveland’s image as a 
failed city was reinforced by a long string of losing seasons by the In-
dians, who played in a dingy stadium tabbed the ‘mistake by the 
lake.’”84 
Corporations also fund teams, athletes, and/or stadia for expres-
sive reasons:  namely, because they wish to associate their brand with 
the positive virtues displayed on the field during the game.85  When 
athletes take to the field, it is not merely their own expressive intent 
that they communicate via their performance but that of the gov-
ernments, corporations, or other groups that fund and promote 
 
 81 James H. Frey & D. Stanley Eitzen, Sport and Society, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 503, 512 (1991) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 82 MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM:  PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN 
METROPOLIS 14 (1997). 
 83 Id. at 7–11, 105–12 (exploring the symbolic importance of teams to the cities they repre-
sent and discussing the economic and social benefits to cities of having home teams). 
 84 Id. at 104. 
 85 See Matthew P. McAllister, College Bowl Sponsorship and the Increased Commercialization of Am-
ateur Sports, 15 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 357, 360 (1998) (exploring the impact of the 
increasing corporate sponsorship of amateur sports and arguing that corporations seek to 
sponsor sports competitions in order to associate themselves with the relatively “risk-free, 
apolitical message of struggle and triumph” sporting events communicate); SMART, supra 
note 64, at 17, 65–102 (noting the increasing commercialization of spectator sports and 
the powerful impact of corporate sponsorship on the cultural significance of spectator 
sports); SPORT AND CORPORATE NATIONALISMS (Michael L. Silk, David L. Andrews & C.L. 
Cole eds., 2005) (exploring how corporations seek to identify themselves with the nation-
alist messages that games promote). 
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them—and whose symbols they often wear on their clothing as they 
play. 
Even those who regulate sports demonstrate an expressive interest 
in the messages that games communicate.  The recent decision by the 
National Football League (“NFL”) to ban what it called “excessive 
[touchdown] celebrations,” for example, was prompted by a concern 
that the touchdown celebrations communicated the wrong mes-
sage—and specifically, celebrated macho individualism, rather than 
the teamwork and good sportsmanship that the NFL wished to pro-
mote instead.86  Efforts by both the NFL and the National Basketball 
Association (“NBA”) to enforce a strict on-court and on-field dress 
code similarly reflect the organizations’ concern that athletes were 
sending the wrong messages by playing the game in the way they 
did.87  These attempts to influence the messages that games com-
municate by changing the rules are only the latest in a long series of 
attempts by the NFL, NBA, and other professional sports leagues to 
shape the expressive meaning of their sports in order to ensure their 
leagues’ profitability and respectability.88 
Rather than the product of a singular expressive intent, the socio-
logical literature reveals sports games to be instead the product of 
multiple—sometimes conflicting—expressive desires on the part of 
those who play, those who promote, those who fund, and those who 
regulate the sports.  This in turn points to the cultural and sometimes 
overtly political significance that games of spectator sports can pos-
sess.  It is because of the symbolic power of what takes place on the 
playing field that governments, corporations, leagues, as well as play-
ers, care so much about what happens during the game. 
 
 86 Phillip Lamarr Cunningham, “Please Don’t Fine Me Again!!!!!”:  Black Athletic Defiance in the 
NBA and NFL, 33 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 39, 45 (2009) (discussing the NFL’s decision to 
penalize athletes and their teams for “ ‘excessive celebrations’ after touchdowns”). 
 87 Id. at 41–43 (arguing that what motivated the new dress code was an anxiety, by primarily 
white owners, about black players’ adoption of “hip-hop” and “gang” dress styles, which 
they feared sent messages of criminality and disrespect for the law which threatened the 
respectability of both sports). Cunningham also notes the significant resistance on the 
part of many athletes to obeying these rules.  Id. at 39–40. 
 88 See, e.g., MICHAEL ORIARD, READING FOOTBALL 25–56 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1993) (ex-
ploring how early football regulators altered the rules of the sport in order to attract 
spectators and to make the game more exciting by emphasizing the achievements of indi-
vidual players—and noting the resistance this generated amongst those committed to a 
more collectivist conception of football); Greg Downey, Producing Pain:  Techniques and 
Technologies in No-Holds-Barred Fighting, 37 SOC. STUD. SCI. 201, 213–16 (2007) (examining 
how promoters of mixed martial arts structured contests in order to ensure a quick flow 
of action,  maintain audience excitement, and increase profitability). 
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B.  The Messages that Games Communicate 
Just as it is not true that the only motivations that drive athletes to 
participate in spectator sports is the competitive and non-expressive 
desire to win, it is also not true that because games are competitions 
they communicate no messages worthy of First Amendment protec-
tion.  To the contrary,  it is because they are competitions that games 
of spectator sports provide a perhaps uniquely powerful medium for 
communicating messages of virtue.  This is because of the aura of au-
thenticity that games possess as competitions.  The fact that what au-
diences see when they watch a sports game is the genuine struggle of 
the competitors to win, rather than a scripted simulacram of that 
struggle, gives sport an aura of authenticity that narrative art, no mat-
ter how gripping, cannot match.  This is not to say that narrative 
art—Shakespeare’s plays, for example—does not provide audiences a 
kind of psychological or artistic truth that sport does not.  Neverthe-
less, the idea that what happens on the playing field is not only real 
but also somehow true is an important source of sport’s appeal, both 
to athletes and to spectators.  As the football historian Michael Oriard 
argues with respect to football, the fact that “behind the spectacle of 
football, real persons are performing real acts” means that “football is 
grounded in a reality absent from the popular romance or adventure 
plot.”89  For this reason, Oriard argues against attempts to equate ath-
letes to entertainers and to analogize sports like football to other 
genres of mass entertainment.  Instead, he argues that the reality of 
sport provides the activity a specific kind of “cultural power” that art 
cannot replicate:  namely, the power “to tell [real] stories . . . in a way 
that no movie or novel can.”90 
Other commentators have noted the peculiar cultural power that 
sports, and those who play sports, possess because of the aura of au-
thenticity that attaches to games and to those who participate in 
them.  Michael Mandelbaum argues, for example, that the fact that 
“[a]ctors who appear to do dangerous, difficult things on the screen 
almost never actually do them [whereas] . . . baseball, football, and 
basketball players really do what spectators see them do” is one rea-
son why athletes have historically been favored over actors as product 
pitchmen.91  “Because the spectator could be confident of the authen-
ticity of their deeds,” advertisers believed that consumers would more 
 
 89 ORIARD, supra note 88, at 9. 
 90 Id. 
91  MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 11. 
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willingly “believe in the sincerity of their words” when they promoted 
a product.92 
The writer Joseph Epstein suggests, similarly, that a great part of 
sports’ appeal to spectators is the authenticity which attaches to it:  
the fact that what happens on the field is “beyond the aid of public 
relations” and, for that reason, is “fraud-free and fakeproof.”93  
Sport may be the toy department of life, but one of its abiding compensa-
tions is that, at least on the field, it is the real thing. . . . With a full count, 
two men on, his team down by one run in the last of the eighth, a batter 
(as well as a pitcher) is beyond the aid of public relations.  At match 
point at Forest Hills a player’s press clippings are of no help. . . . In all 
these situations, and hundreds of others, a man either comes through or 
he doesn’t.  He is alone out there, naked but for his ability, which counts 
for everything.  Something there is that is elemental about this, and 
something greatly satisfying.94 
It is also because what happens on the field is real in this way that 
spectator sports provide, as the sociologist Barry Smart notes, “one of 
the most significant . . . institutional sites for popular cultural recog-
nition and acclaim of exceptional performance and prowess, if not 
the most prominent context in which the deeds of participants con-
tinue to retain authenticity.”95  Nor is it simply athletes’ physical 
prowess that audiences recognize and acclaim.  This is demonstrated 
by the fact that athletes tend to get celebrated as heroes and role 
models, not just as celebrities.  The difference between a celebrity 
and a hero, of course, is the moral value that attaches to the latter but 
not to the former.  Whereas celebrities are individuals who are 
“known for [their] well-knownness,”96 sports heroes are “individuals 
who gain honor” through the “public display[of] their personal 
prowess, moral character, and social worth in [a] competition evalu-
ated by their peers and the broader society.”97 
 
 92 Id. at 16. 
 93 Joseph Epstein, Obsessed With Sport:  On the Interpretation of a Fan’s Dreams, HARPER’S MAG., 
July 1976, at 71. 
 94 Id. 
 95 SMART, supra note 64, at 9. 
 96 DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE:  A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 57 (1961) (em-
phasis omitted). 
 97 MEDIASPORT 138 ((Lawrence A. Wenner, ed., 1998) (citing John W. Loy and Graham L. 
Hesketh, THE AGON MOTIF:  A PROLEGOMENON FOR THE STUDY OF AGONETIC BEHAVIOR, in 
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF SPORT (Kalevi Olin ed., 1984)).  See also 
Gill Lines, Villians, Fools or Heroes?  Sports Stars as Role Models for Young People, 20 LEISURE 
STUD. 285, 285 (2001) (“The sporting hero has traditionally been perceived of as epito-
mizing social ideals and masculine virtues, and as embodying values that learnt on the 
playing fields will readily transfer into everyday life.”). 
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Of course, athletes frequently fail to live up to their status as he-
roes and role models—in part because the virtues that they display 
when on the field are not necessarily easily translatable into everyday 
life.98  Yet, the intense criticism leveled against athletes when they fail 
in their personal lives to live up to their role model status only em-
phasizes the strength of the association between superior athletic per-
formance and moral, as well as physical, excellence.  We would not be 
so disappointed in athletes when they fail to demonstrate exemplary 
behavior off the field if we did not believe what they told us by their 
performance on the field:  namely, that they are not simply superior 
physical specimens but they also embody the sporting virtues—
among these, “courage, . . . perseverance, assertiveness, generosi-
ty, . . . dependability, honesty, and character.”99 
For many of the same reasons that it provides a powerful medium 
for the expression of messages of individual excellence and virtue, 
spectator sports also provide an important vehicle for communicating 
messages about political community.  The strong association that 
tends to be made between athletes and the towns, regions, or nations 
where they live or on whose behalf they play means that what athletes 
demonstrate by their performance in the game is not only their own 
strength and valor but that of the political community with whom 
they are metonymically identified.  It is for this reason, of course, that 
governments provide so much economic as well as non-economic 
support to local teams and sports programs.100  By funding sport, they 
 
 98 See, e.g., Lines, supra note 97, at 285 (noting the contemporary construction of the sport 
hero as “damaged”); STANLEY H. TEITLEBAUM, SPORTS HEROES, FALLEN IDOLS (2005) (dis-
cussing how the pressure to succeed and the sense of entitlement that comes with being a 
sports icon create circumstances that are ripe for sports stars to make bad decisions and 
lose everything). 
 99 MEDIASPORT 138 (Lawrence A. Wenner, ed., 1998) (citation omitted). 
100 For an informative account of the expressive, and more specifically nationalist motiva-
tions behind early efforts to establish a U.S. Olympic team, see MARK DYRESON, MAKING 
THE AMERICAN TEAM:  SPORT, CULTURE, AND THE OLYMPIC EXPERIENCE (1998).  Dyreson 
notes that one of the primary objectives of those who promoted the development of the 
Olympic program was a desire to demonstrate that “modern American civilization did in-
deed produce . . . the ‘strongest and boldest people.’”  Id. at 59 (quoting Theodore Roo-
sevelt).  The desire to demonstrate, via the number of medals won at the Olympic Games, 
the strength and power of the nation and its people remains a common theme in the 
promotion of the U.S. Olympic team and is replicated by similarly nationalist efforts in 
other countries.  For a discussion of nationalism displayed by various countries through 
participation in the Olympics and other international sporting events, see generally 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL SPORTS EVENTS:  CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SPECTACLE IN 
THE OLYMPICS AND THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP (Alan Tomlinson & Christopher Young 
eds., 2006); ALAN BAIRNER, SPORT, NATIONALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION:  EUROPEAN AND 
NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (2001). 
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also, in many cases, seek to promote a sense of national, or local, 
identity. 
Indeed, sport has long been used as a powerful vehicle of collec-
tive identification, be it at the local or national level.  Games provide 
an important vehicle for the expression of collective belonging 
because they provide a shared object—the local team or player—
around which citizens can collectively identify.  As the anthropologist 
Joseph Adjaye notes 
[S]ports provide a unique medium for articulating national sentiments in 
a highly symbolic way.  The sports arena makes more real the nation or 
imagined community.  It incites the national psyche as no other activity, 
often acting as a surrogate for politics. . . . For third-world nations, in par-
ticular, sports often carries a special political function that goes beyond 
national pride; it can evoke a deep national consciousness that superfi-
cially masks internal divisions and forge a façade of unity.  Thus in coun-
tries where internal tensions exist, international sports can provide a 
stimulant to apparent harmony, for throughout history, sports has been 
employed not only as a tool in nation building, but also as a means of 
transcending internal strife.101 
In the act of collectively cheering their team or athlete to victory, 
fans experience, and reinforce, the ties that bind them to one anoth-
er.102  In so doing, as Adjaye notes, they make the “imagined commu-
nity” of the nation—or the political community of the city or region 
that the athletes represent—“more real.”103  For this reason, the geog-
rapher John Bale argues that “[s]port has become perhaps the main 
medium of collective identification in an era when bonding is more 
frequently a result of achievement.”104  When athletes take to the 
field, what they communicate is not only a message of individual or 
even collective virtue and valor; what they communicate is something 
about collective identity itself:  about “what sort of identities consti-
 
101 Joseph K. Adjaye, Reimagining Sports:  African Athletes, Defection, and Ambiguous Citizenship, 
57 AFR. TODAY 26, 32–33 (2010). 
102 Scholarship exploring spectator identification with teams is vast.  For some good exam-
ples, see GARRY CRAWFORD, CONSUMING SPORT:  FANS, SPORT AND CULTURE 53 (2004) 
(noting the important role that sport spectatorship plays in “creat[ing a] sense of com-
munity and belonging” among fans); JOSEPH MAGUIRE, POWER AND GLOBAL SPORT:  
ZONES OF PRESTIGE, EMULATION AND RESISTANCE 109 (2005) (arguing that “[s]port pro-
vides an important arena for the construction, maintenance and challenging of identities 
and has the capacity to bind together individuals, local communities, nations and the 
world–but also to fragment them”); NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL SPORTS EVENTS:  
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND SPECTACLE IN THE OLYMPICS AND THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP 
(Alan Tomlinson & Christopher Young eds., 2006) (exploring how national identities 
come to be constructed through international sport competitions). 
103  Adjaye, supra note 101.  
104 JOHN BALE, SPORTS GEOGRAPHY 14 (1989). 
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tute our countries and nations and other people’s countries and na-
tions.”105 
Games also express other messages that may not be as expressly 
intended by those who play, support, or fund spectator sports.  Sports 
philosophers point, for example, to the aesthetic messages that are 
expressed by what we might call a “virtuous” or “courageous” perfor-
mance.  As the philosophers Teresa Lacerda and Stephen Mumford 
note 
A victory can seem beautiful or dramatic because of the maximum effort 
and focus of the athlete, even though they have no desire to produce 
beauty or drama.  Sport’s aesthetic value derives frequently from situa-
tions where athletes are confronted by their limits, and their attempts to 
surpass themselves is one of the most appreciated aspects of the sport. . . . 
Examples come to mind of Bernard Hinault, finishing a stage of the Tour 
de France with blood streaming down his face and of Gabriela Andersen-
Schiess, who entered the Los Angeles Olympic stadium at the end of the 
1984 marathon staggering and struggling to finish the competition.  
Such cases show the ability of sport to turn the ugly into the beautiful 
and profound.106 
It is not only the spectacle of human beings in prime condition 
performing skills that, in many cases, they have spent a lifetime ac-
quiring and perfecting that makes sport beautiful to watch, Mumford 
and Lacerda suggest here, although the grace and beauty of the per-
formance is one of the attractions that draws viewers to sport.107  The 
aesthetic value, they suggest, also lies in sports’ ability to render the 
human struggle against adversity visible, in stark tableau. 
Athletes may not specifically mean to convey messages of beauty of 
this kind.  Indeed, the moments of intense effort to which Mumford 
and Lacerda refer may in fact be moments where the athlete is insen-
sible to the audience and lost, like an actor or a musician, in the flow 
 
105 GARRY WHANNEL, CULTURE, POLITICS AND SPORT:  BLOWING THE WHISTLE, REVISITED 170 
(2008). 
106 Teresa Lacerda & Stephen Mumford, The Genius in Art and in Sport:  A Contribution to the 
Investigation of Aesthetics of Sport, 37 J. PHIL. SPORT 182, 186 (2010). 
107 See WANN ET AL., supra note15, at 34 (noting that one of the factors that leads individuals 
to become sports fans is an appreciation of “the artistic beauty and grace of sport move-
ments” and that “the aesthetic motive is not limited to fans of stylistic sports” such as fig-
ure skating or gymnastics but that fans of other sports “may also express a high level of 
aesthetic motivation.  For instance, football fans who remember Lynn Swann (a wide re-
ceiver for the Pittsburgh Steelers) often describe the artistic nature of his leaping catches.  
Similarly, track and field fans often speak of the beauty and grace of such events as the 
discus, pole vault, and hurdles.”); Garry J. Smith, The Noble Sports Fan, 12 J. SPORT & SOC. 
ISSUES 54, 58 (1988) (“Comitted sport fans say that one of the reasons they follow sport is 
that they are fascinated by the excellence, beauty, and creativity in an athlete’s perfor-
mance. . . . Devotees will speak rapturously, years later, of great moments they witnessed:  
a Gretzky goal, a Dr. J move, or a Nadia Comaneci perfect routine.”). 
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of the performance.  Nevertheless, the aesthetic messages that they 
convey by their performance are hard to disentangle from the mes-
sages of virtue, character, and courage that athletes more self-
consciously intend.  It is, after all, the bravery and determination that 
the athlete displays that makes his or her performance beautiful even 
when it is not pretty, graceful, or easy but instead blood-spattered and 
arduous.  These aesthetic messages therefore add complexity to what 
it means for athletes to demonstrate, via public competition, their vir-
tue, skill, and character. 
Games communicate messages about individual identity as well.  It 
is because of the importance of spectator sports as a site for the 
demonstration of individual excellence and achievement that what 
happens on the playing field, and who populates it, can have a 
powerful influence on popular conceptions of what kinds of persons 
have value, and what values matter.  Hence, feminists argue that the 
male-dominated nature of the major spectator sports, and the violent 
and aggressive virtues they celebrate, play a key role in the 
articulation and reinforcement of a notion of “hegemonic 
masculinity” that, they argue, harms both women and non-normative 
men.108  For the same reason, critics argue that modern spectator 
sports play a powerful role in reproducing racial inequalities and 
stereotypes.109 Others point, however, to the tremendous importance 
that the entrance of female and minority athletes into the major 
spectator sports has had on the struggle for racial and gender 
equality, by reshaping the popular conception of what minorities and 
 
108 R.W. Connell, An Iron Man: The Body and Some Contradictions of Hegemonic Masculinity, in 
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER:  CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 83, 94 (Michael 
A. Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) (arguing that sports help construct a culturally 
idealized form of masculine character that “connect[s] . . . masculinity to toughness and 
competitiveness” and which she calls “hegemonic masculinity”); Marie Hardin et. al.,  
‘Have You Got Game?’  Hegemonic Masculinity and Neo-Homophobia in U.S. Newspaper Sports 
Columns, 2 COMM., CULTURE & CRITIQUE 182, 185 (2009) (“The most powerful institution 
for ‘shoring up’ hegemonic masculinity in the United States has been the sports/media 
complex. . . . [M]en who participate in sports that most exemplify the qualities of hege-
monic masculinity are constructed as embodiments of the ideal.” (internal citation omit-
ted)). 
109 HOBERMAN, supra note 70 (arguing that the astronomical social mobility of many black 
athletes, who represent, obviously, only a small percentage of the population, distort pub-
lic perceptions of the opportunity structure for blacks, causing many whites to assume 
that blacks no longer face discrimination); D. STANLEY EITZEN, FAIR AND FOUL: BEYOND 
THE MYTHS AND PARADOXES OF SPORT 7 (1999) (exploring how sport promotes a percep-
tion of equal opportunity that occludes pervasive racial inequalities and noting that while 
professional sports present an opportunity for social mobility, the odds of athletes ascend-
ing to professional leagues are slim). 
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women can do or achieve.110  In either case, what is clear is that sport 
provides a powerful medium for the expression and contestation of 
dominant notions of gender, race, and sexuality.  Of course, like the 
aesthetic messages discussed earlier, athletes or others associated with 
the game may not specifically intend to communicate messages of 
this sort—although in some cases, they clearly do intend to.111  
Nevertheless, the fact that games frequently do communicate 
messages of this sort only provides further evidence of the sometimes 
profound cultural, even political, significance that spectator sport can 
possess, not despite but because it is a competitive activity that is able 
to communicate messages that are both densely symbolic and also 
somehow true. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The political and cultural significance of what takes place on the 
field during the games of spectator sports has obvious doctrinal and 
philosophical implications. 
A.  Doctrinal Implications 
Doctrinally, what it means is that spectator sports satisfy both ele-
ments of the Spence test for expressive conduct.  As the first element 
of the Spence test requires, games reflect the expressive desires of 
those who play, fund, promote, or regulate sport to communicate via 
 
110 Michael Eric Dyson, for example, argues that Michael Jordan’s success on the basketball 
court made him a powerful symbol of “racial and cultural desires to fly beyond limits and 
obstacles,” an embodiment of perhaps a post-racial America.  Michael Eric Dyson, Be Like 
Mike?:  Michael Jordan and the Pedagogy of Desire, 7 CULTURAL STUD. 64, 71 (1993).  Others 
point to the importance that Jackie Robinson’s entrance into the major league held for 
the struggle for racial equality in the United States.  See, e.g., John Kelly, Integrating Ameri-
ca:  Jackie Robinson, Critical Events and Baseball Black and White, 22 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT 
1011, 1012 (2005) (“Jackie Robinson was the first black American known by most of white 
America.  His were the struggles observed, understood and embraced.  His campaign re-
oriented public culture and the body politic.  Maybe.”); Charles E. Schumer, Foreword, in 
JACKIE ROBINSON:  RACE, SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM ix (Joseph Dorison & Joram 
Warmund eds., 1995) (“On April 15, 1947, Jack Roosevelt Robinson changed America 
forever.”). 
111 A particularly famous example of an athlete who specifically intended to convey a mes-
sage about gender by her participation in the game of a spectator sport is Billie Jean King 
who, in 1973, took part in the a highly-publicized tennis match—entitled the “Battle of 
the Sexes”—in order to demonstrate that women could not only compete against men, 
but could triumph over them in competition.  See Nancy E. Spencer, Reading Between the 
Lines:  A Discursive Analysis of the Billie Jean King vs. Bobby Riggs “Battle of the Sexes,” 17 SOC. 
SPORT J. 386, 386 (2000) (describing Billie Jean King’s victory over Bobby Riggs in 1973 
and classifying it as “perhaps the most important event in women’s tennis history”). 
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their performance “particularized messages” of individual or collec-
tive virtue—and perhaps other messages as well (messages of national 
pride, of racial equality, of beauty, etc.).  As the second element of 
the Spence test requires, these messages are intelligible.  The conven-
tionality of sport as a genre of performance makes it in fact an espe-
cially intelligible medium for the communication of symbolic mes-
sages when compared to highbrow genres of artistic performance, 
which tend to favor the subversion or transformation of existing sym-
bolic conventions.112  In spectator sports, in contrast to more elite 
genres of entertainment, the performance works only if actors follow 
the rules.  Following the rules is, in fact, one of the virtues that sports 
express and display.113  This makes the messages that games express 
particularly easy to understand—a fact that may, in turn, be one rea-
son for sports’ mass appeal.114 
There is thus no doctrinal justification for denying spectator 
sports First Amendment protection.  This conclusion is buttressed by 
the 2011 decision, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, in which the 
Supreme Court recognized video games as a form of expression enti-
tled to First Amendment protection.115  In recognizing video games as 
First Amendment-protected expression, the Court expressly rejected 
arguments—similar to those made by the Interactive Digital Software 
Ass’n court—that because video games, like other kinds of games, are 
“interactive” activities whose ending is not fixed in advance but de-
termined by the actions of the players, they do not merit the constitu-
tional protection afforded other, less-interactive, genres of expres-
sion, such as movies, books, and art.116  Justice Antonin Scalia, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Brown, acknowledged that the experi-
 
112 See ANDREAS HUYSSEN, AFTER THE GREAT DIVIDE:  MODERNISM, MASS CULTURE, Postmod-
ernism 4-7 (1986) (chronicling the twentieth-century concept of the avant-garde and of 
art as a challenge to existing convention). 
113 See WILLIAM J. MORGAN, WHY SPORTS MORALLY MATTER 146 (2006) (“[I]n sports, it is cru-
cial that everyone start from the proverbial same starting line, so that no one enjoys a leg 
up on the competition.  At the very least, this entails an impartial observance and applica-
tion of the rules to ensure that similar cases are treated similarly.”). 
114 MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 7–8 (“The modern age brought incoherence to the tradi-
tional forms of artistic expression. . . . The highest value of a work of art came to be re-
garded as originality; but what was original was also often obscure. . . . [Sports, in con-
trast,] offer entertainment to the masses, and a principal reason for this is that they are 
supremely coherent. . . . At the end of each game, the spectators and the participants 
know which side has won.  While the news section of the daily newspaper may report the 
baffling and the unintelligible, the sports section features succinct histories that everyone 
can understand, with a clear-cut beginning, middle, and end.”). 
115 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“California correctly 
acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.”). 
116 Id. at 2737–38. 
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ence of playing a video game is, as Justice Samuel Alito argued in dis-
sent, “different in ‘kind’” from the experience of reading a book.117  
He nevertheless rejected the claim that this difference was constitu-
tionally significant.  Since he found that “video games communicate 
ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary de-
vices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through fea-
tures distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with 
the virtual world),” Scalia concluded that video games were, “[l]ike 
the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,” fully 
protected by the First Amendment.118 
What was true of the video games in Brown is true of spectator 
sports.  Although most games of spectator sports lack some of the 
“familiar literary devices” that Scalia highlighted in Brown, such as 
music and dialogue, they clearly possess others.  They provide, for 
example, larger-than-life characters that audiences can adore or re-
vile.  In the movement from the beginning to the end of the perfor-
mance, they also narrate a story—though a story whose meaning 
might depend, to a great degree, upon which team one is rooting for.  
The fact that the end of the game’s narrative is not known in ad-
vance, but depends upon what happens on the field during the per-
formance—as is not true of most kinds of artistic performance, but is 
true of video games—does not make sport necessarily any less expres-
sive than other, less-interactive genres of entertainment, as Brown 
makes clear.  Instead, it only adds to the power and urgency of the 
dramatic narrative of the game, and in some cases, also the season.  
As Michael Mandelbaum argues 
[S]ports offer a particularly compelling form of drama.  The outcome of 
a game, unlike that of a scripted drama, is unknown.  Few people watch 
the same play or motion picture repeatedly because after they have seen 
it once they know the ending.  The tension is gone.  But tension suffuses 
each and every game of baseball, football and basketball.  Moreover, in 
organized sports the tension carries beyond each individual game and 
tends to increase over time.  Each game is part of a designated se-
quence—a season—the goal of which is to produce a champion. . . . Sus-
pense mounts because, as the end of the season approaches, games tend 
to become more important to the determination of the champion.  In 
this way baseball, football and basketball resemble the oldest of literary 
forms, the epic.  Like the greatest of them, the Odyssey, the protago-
nist—in the case of sports, the team—encounters a series of challenges 
that it must meet to achieve its ultimate goal.119 
 
117 Id. at 2737 n.4. 
118 Id. at 2733. 
119 MANDELBAUM, supra note 69, at 5. 
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Mandelbaum is not the only writer to compare spectator sports to 
art.  Indeed, comparisons to poetry, drama, and theatre abound.  A. 
Bartlett Giamatti, former commissioner of Major League Baseball, 
described baseball as “a narrative, an epic of exile and return, a vast, 
communal poem about separation, loss, and the hope for reunion” 
and the “Romance Epic of homecoming America sings to itself.”120  
Saul Steinberg argues that “[b]aseball is an allegorical play about 
America, a poetic, complex and subtle play of courage, fear, good 
luck, mistakes, patience about fate and sober self-esteem. . . .”121  Joyce 
Carol Oates writes that “[e]ach boxing match is a story—a unique 
and highly condensed drama without words.”122 
In truth, sports games are only metaphorically similar to epic 
dramas, poems, or ballets.  They may possess many of the same dra-
matic and symbolic elements as these kinds of artistic performance, 
but the fact that they are competitions means that they communicate 
and express cultural meaning differently than does a drama, a poem, 
or a play.  The analogy with art arises, nonetheless, because of the 
deeply expressive character of both art and spectator sports.  What 
theorists mean when they say sport is an epic drama, a poem, or a 
play is that sports games convey, in a similarly dramatic and densely 
symbolic form, important cultural themes or messages.  For this rea-
son, although sport may be “different in kind” than other kinds of 
expression that the First Amendment protects, it is no less deserving 
of protection under Spence than are movies, dance performances—or, 
for that matter, video games. 
B.  Philosophical Implications 
The cultural and political significance of what takes place during 
the game of a spectator sport also means that there is no philosophi-
cal justification for denying protection to sports but extending it to 
art and audience-oriented entertainment.  By philosophical justifica-
tion, I mean a justification grounded in the aims and purposes that 
First Amendment doctrine is intended to advance. 
A notion of constitutional purpose has traditionally played an im-
portant role in modern First Amendment jurisprudence.  When Jus-
tices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis reimagined the First 
 
120 A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, TAKE TIME FOR PARADISE:  AMERICANS AND THEIR GAMES 95 
(1989). 
121 ALBERT THEODORE POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 9 (2003); HAROLD ROSENBURG, 
SAUL STEINBERG (1978). 
122 JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 8 (1987). 
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Amendment in the early twentieth century as a powerful justiciable 
check on governmental power, they did so by turning away from the 
rather restrictive notion of what it meant to abridge “the freedom of 
speech” available at the Founding.123  Since then, the Court has per-
sistently refused to define the scope of First Amendment protection 
with reference to the precise intentions of the Framers.124  However, it 
has also refused to extend First Amendment protection to all activi-
ties that, in ordinary language, would constitute speech, or that we 
might consider, in one way or another, to be expressive.125  Instead, 
the Court has tended to justify the doctrinal rules it has established to 
distinguish protected speech from unprotected conduct in terms of 
the broad purposes that the First Amendment was intended to serve.  
Hence, in the famous early twentieth-century concurrences and dis-
sents in which they laid out the framework of the modern doctrine, 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis justified extending protection to even 
politically unpopular speech as necessary to further the core purpose 
of the First Amendment, which Holmes identified as the protection 
of the “free trade in ideas,” and Brandeis identified instead as the 
protection of democracy against “the occasional tyrannies of govern-
 
123 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 
835 (2012) (“When the First Amendment was adopted in 1791, the standard legal 
view . . . was that the guarantee of freedom of the press banned prior restraints on publi-
cation but did not prevent subsequent punishments for libel or seditious advocacy.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 n.3 (1992) (“[I]t seems clear 
that during the founding period, much of what we now consider ‘speech’ was thought to 
be unprotected, and speech could be regulated if it could be shown to cause injury or of-
fense.”).  See generally MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS 
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 7–9 (1991) (examining the basis of libertarian interpre-
tations of the First Amendment); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1207–09 (1983) (describing the early twentieth-
century historical evolution of the meaning of “freedom of speech” and the invention of a 
new libertarian tradition). 
124 Sunstein, supra note 123, at 256 (“The current state of free speech in America owes a 
great deal to extremely aggressive interpretations by the Supreme Court . . . . These deci-
sions cannot be justified by reference to the original understanding of the First Amend-
ment.”). 
125 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (Although “it is possible to find some 
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes[,] . . . such a kernel is 
not sufficient [by itself] to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amend-
ment.”).  See also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773–84 (2004) (“That the 
boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of 
the word ‘speech’ is simply implausible. . . . [T]he speech with which the First Amend-
ment is even slightly concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every 
part of our lives.”). 
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ing majorities.”126  Several decades later, a majority of the Court again 
invoked the democracy-promoting purpose of the First Amendment 
to justify, among other things, the extension of free speech protec-
tion to labor picketing and the imposition of significant limits on the 
government’s ability to prosecute libel.127 
Scholars have also invoked sometimes divergent conceptions of 
the First Amendment’s purpose to explain, as well as to challenge, 
the doctrinal rules.128  Given what Robert Post has identified as the 
over-expansiveness of the Spence test, it is conceivable that, even if 
spectator sports satisfy the doctrinal test for expressive conduct, there 
may be other, philosophical reasons for denying sport First Amend-
ment protection—reasons that are not fully captured by the Spence 
test but that nevertheless influence how courts interpret it.  Yet, it is 
very difficult to see what these reasons may be. 
Certainly, if we consider the question of spectator sports’ First 
Amendment status in light of the most commonly invoked of the 
amendment’s purposes—namely, the protection and facilitation of 
democracy in the United States—there is no justification for extend-
ing protection to art and entertainment and denying it to spectator 
sports.  This may seem a counterintuitive claim to make, given the, at 
best, highly attenuated relationship between spectator sports and 
democratic political processes and debates.  Indeed, some scholars—
most notably, Robert Bork—have argued that, if the purpose of the 
First Amendment is to protect democracy in the United States by pro-
tecting the free and open political debate necessary to sustain it, as 
 
126 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
127 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, in order 
to give First Amendment freedoms the “breathing space that they need to survive,” public 
officials may not recover for defamation “relating to [their] official conduct unless [they] 
prove that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) (concluding 
that, because “[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of 
labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the pro-
cesses of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” labor 
picketing is entitled to First Amendment protection). 
128 The literature analyzing and critiquing First Amendment doctrine from one or another 
purposive perspective is extensive.  For a good survey, see Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Jus-
tifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 145 (1989) (finding that “[a]rguments from democracy 
have been said in a comparative study to be the ‘most influential . . . in the development 
of twentieth-century free speech law’” and noting the importance of free speech to liberal 
democracy); see also Schauer, supra note 125, at 1785–86 (critiquing the various purposive 
accounts of First Amendment boundaries that have been proposed). 
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many have argued that it is,129 then the only kind of speech to which 
free speech protection should extend is speech that is “explicitly po-
litical.”130  On this view of what it means for the First Amendment to 
safeguard democracy, the vast majority of works of art would not be 
protected by the First Amendment—and neither would all spectator 
sports. 
The Supreme Court has, however, embraced a much broader 
conception of what speech must be protected in order to ensure that 
it is, as James Madison put it, the “People, not the Government, 
[that] possess the absolute sovereignty.”131  In Winters, the Supreme 
Court recognized that true crime magazines, although not expressly 
political, had the capacity to both educate and politicize their audi-
ence through their depiction of the social world and for that reason 
were entitled to First Amendment protection.132  Four years later, in 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court found the same to be true of 
motion pictures; since films have the capacity to “affect public atti-
tudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal 
of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which 
characterizes all artistic expression,” the Court held that even non-
 
129 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 128 and accompanying text; Post, supra note 60, at 1275 
(“The most prominent and important form of social order for First Amendment juris-
prudence is what I have elsewhere called ‘democracy.’ . . . [L]arge patches of core First 
Amendment doctrine in fact express the normative aspirations of this specific kind of so-
cial order, which seeks to sustain the value of self-government by reconciling individual 
and collective autonomy through the medium of public discourse.”); Martin H. Redish & 
Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes:  The Central Role of Adver-
sary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2009) (“De-
mocracy could not exist, in any meaningful sense, absent a societal commitment to basic 
notions of free expression, nor could free expression flourish in a society uncommitted to 
democracy.  It is therefore not surprising that among the most prominent and widely ac-
cepted theories of the First Amendment are those that explain the Free Speech Clause as 
either a catalyst for or a protection of democracy itself.”). 
130 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27–28 
(1971) (“The category of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with gov-
ernmental behavior, policy or personnel, whether the governmental unit involved is ex-
ecutive, legislative, judicial or administrative.  Explicitly political speech is speech about 
how we are governed . . . .”).  Bork notes that the category “includes a wide range of eval-
uation, criticism, electioneering and propaganda” but “does not cover scientific, educa-
tional, commercial, or literary expression as such.”  Id. at 28; see also Lillian R. BeVier, The 
First Amendment and Political Speech:  An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1978) (arguing that in principle, First Amendment protection 
extends only to political speech, although acknowledging the possibility that in practice, 
“pragmatic and institutional concerns” might justify the extension of First Amendment 
protection to some kinds of art). 
131 Sunstein, supra note 123, at 256 (quoting James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolution, 
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,  1906)). 
132 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
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political movies were entitled to the same degree of constitutional 
protection as was afforded more explicitly political speech.133  In the 
years since Joseph Burstyn, members of the Court have continued to 
affirm that art and entertainment are entitled to the highest degree 
of First Amendment protection because of their ability to express 
and, in turn, shape public attitudes and beliefs.134  The Court has con-
tinued to recognize, in other words, that artistic expression must be 
protected because of its capacity to influence, even if only indirectly, 
democratic political debates by influencing how members of the poli-
ty understand and imagine the world around them. 
Under this more capacious conception of what it means for the 
First Amendment to safeguard democracy in the United States, there 
is no justification for denying protection to spectator sports.  This is 
because, like movies and other kinds of audience-oriented enter-
tainment, spectator sports have the capacity to “affect public attitudes 
and behavior in a variety of ways,”—as the previous Part should al-
ready have made clear.  By providing a forum for the demonstration 
and valorization of individual virtue, games help shape ideas of what 
virtues matter and who possesses them.  They influence popular no-
tions of gender, sexuality, and race.  They reinforce, and make more 
effectively powerful, collective identities, including national ones.  By 
providing a venue in which individuals appear to compete on a truly 
even playing field, sports may also help to reinforce popular faith in 
the meritocratic ideal so important to American democracy.135  In 
these ways, games of spectator sports help shape our conceptions of 
the normative social order and, by implication, the rules that should 
govern it.  As such, games of spectator sports are political, or at least 
politically relevant, in the same way that the Burstyn court recognized 
 
133 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
134 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that because art has the potential to affect public attitudes and behavior in 
various ways,, “[i]t goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First 
Amendment protection” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501)). 
135 See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 62, at 20–21 (noting that team sports in the United 
States express the principle of merit and the democratic ideal that we all have to play by 
the same rules); Gerald Early et. al., Baseball, Boxing and the Charisma of Sport and Race, in 
The Charisma of Sport and Race, 8 DOREEN B. TOWNSEND CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERS 5 
(Christina M. Gillis ed., 1996) (“Sport is about meritocracy.  People are attracted to sport 
often because it is pure meritocracy.  You have to be excellent at sport, and that excel-
lence supposedly transcends any social construction except the social construction of 
‘athlete’ which, ideally, is just reified merit, actualized desire and ambition, or apolitical 
excellence.  Of course, sport has practiced race and gender exclusion, but in the rational 
liberalism that sport represents, this exclusion has been seen as a form of corruption of 
sport’s ‘truth.’”); Eitzen, supra note 70, at 249 (“Typically, Americans believe that sport is 
a path to upward social mobility.”). 
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movies could be, and later decisions recognized to be true of music, 
drama, poetry, and dance as well. 
Even if one accepts the narrower, Borkian view of what speech 
must be protected in order to safeguard democracy in the United 
States, there is little reason to believe that art should receive protec-
tion and spectator sports should not.  Most art is, after all, not explic-
itly political, in the sense that Bork uses the term, to refer to “speech 
concerned with governmental behavior, policy or personnel.”136  The 
Borkian interpretation of what it means for the First Amendment to 
safeguard democracy does not, therefore, justify the current doctrinal 
arrangement any more than the more expansive interpretation 
adopted by the Court in Winters and Joseph Burstyn does; nor does Cass 
Sunstein’s recent effort to carve out a somewhat broader category of 
political speech than that which Bork proposes.  Sunstein defines the 
category of speech he thinks must be protected in order to safeguard 
democracy in the United States as “speech intended and received as a 
contribution to public deliberation.”137  In this category, he includes 
some but not all art.  Sunstein argues, for example, that Charles 
Dicken’s novel Bleak House and the photographs of Robert Mapple-
thorpe, should be considered political speech because, in both cases, 
they engage, and were intended to engage, with pressing social issues 
of their time (the exploitation of the worker, in the first case, and 
questions of privacy and sexuality in the second case).138  Sunstein’s 
argument, therefore, would clearly extend protection to some art and 
deny protection to some spectator sports that are intended to fulfill a 
purely entertainment function.  What Sunstein’s argument would not 
do, however, is establish the kind of categorical distinction between 
art and spectator sports that exists in the case law.  Indeed, one could 
easily argue that, under Sunstein’s definition of political speech, at 
least some spectator sports should receive First Amendment protec-
tion.  Billie Jean King’s battle against Bobby Riggs in the 1973 tennis 
match, entitled the “Battle of the Sexes,” was, after all, clearly intend-
ed and received as a contribution to public deliberation, as was Jackie 
Robinson’s participation in Major League Baseball.139 
 
136 Bork, supra note 130, at 27. 
137 Sunstein, supra note 123, at 306. 
138 Id. at 308 (“Both Ulysses and Bleak House are unquestionably political for First Amendment 
purposes.  The same is true of Robert Mapplethorpe’s work . . . .”). 
139 Kelly, supra note 110, at 1018–23 (describing the extensive deliberation and planning in-
volved in Jackie Robinson’s signing with the Brooklyn Dodgers and the explicitly political 
terms in which both Robinson and others viewed his entrance into Major League Base-
ball); Spencer, supra note 111, at 393 (noting that King participated in the match because 
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None of the conflicting views of what it means for the First 
Amendment to protect democracy—and what speech must be pro-
tected in order to do so—thus justify the current doctrinal arrange-
ment.  Nor can the different status afforded spectator sports and art 
in the case law be justified under the other purposes that jurists and 
scholars invoke to justify or explain First Amendment doctrine.  Nei-
ther sport nor art provide the kind of objective truth whose discovery 
Justice Holmes, in Abrams v. United States, famously argued it was the 
purpose of the First Amendment to foster, although both genres of 
expression may provide their own kinds of truth—what we might call 
aesthetic or psychological truth in the case of art, and what we could 
call moral truth in the case of sports.140  Were we to conceive the 
search for truth fostered by the First Amendment as a search for sub-
jective, rather than purely objective truth, both art and sport would 
therefore have a plausible claim to protection.141  It would, in other 
words, be difficult to argue that art contributes in a more significant 
way to the discovery of “subjective truth” than sport. 
It is similarly unclear why art would receive protection under a 
First Amendment conceived primarily as a guarantee of individual 
liberty or autonomy, but sport would not.  If “the significance of free 
expression rests on the central human capacity to create and express 
symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures, and music, in-
tended to communicate in determinate, complex, and subtle ways[,]” 
 
she recognized the broader social implications of the match, especially on the fight for 
gender equality and the role of women in sports). 
140 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search 
for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential 
argument supporting the constitutional commitment to freedom of speech is the conten-
tion that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth.”); JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY 67-176 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003) (offering a classic 
articulation of the “search for truth” rationale of freedom of speech). 
141 See Greenawalt, supra note 128, at 132 (suggesting subjective truth as a plausible interpre-
tation of the search for truth rationale).  But see Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:  A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (1984) (“[I]f truth is to defeat falsity through ro-
bust debate in the marketplace, truth must be discoverable and susceptible of substantia-
tion.  If truth is not ascertainable or cannot be substantiated, the victory of truth in the 
marketplace is but an unprovable axiom.  In order to be discoverable, however, truth 
must be an objective rather than a subjective, chosen concept.”). 
1150 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:4 
 
as David Richards argues that it does,142 then surely the values are fos-
tered equally well when an athlete exercises these capacities on the 
playing field rather than in the concert hall.  Of course, one could 
argue that sport provides a less “complex and subtle” vocabulary for 
the exercise and development of human creativity, but here we enter 
the thickets of subjective opinion.  In fact, athletes are careful to em-
phasize the complexity and subtlety of their art in the face of perva-
sive assumptions that at least certain kinds of sports—combative 
sports such as boxing, for example—involve nothing more than the 
exercise of brute force.143  Sports fans also tend to celebrate the sub-
tlety and complexity of the moves that great players demonstrate on 
the playing field and the creativity they display in negotiating, and ul-
timately, transcending, the constraints of the game.144  The argument 
that spectator sports do not deserve free speech protection thus 
seems as difficult to make under a liberty or autonomy rationale as it 
is to make under the democratic rationale of the First Amendment.  
Indeed, it is hard to think of another genre of performance in which 
the themes of individual autonomy and self-mastery are more pro-
nounced than they are in sport. 
Despite general agreement in the cases that sports are not a mode 
of expression entitled to free speech protection, it thus turns out to 
be just as difficult to justify the constitutional distinction between 
spectator sports and art by reference to the aims and purposes of the 
 
142 David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:  Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
143 See Wacquant, supra note 71, at 501 (“Fighters conceive of boxing not as a springboard for 
aggression and an exercise in violence but as a skilled bodily trade, a competitive perfor-
mance craft requiring sophisticated technical know-how and an abiding moral commit-
ment that will enable them not only to improve their material lot but also, and more ur-
gently, to construct a publicly recognized, heroic self.”).  Scholars who have studied MMA note 
a similar resistance among fighters to the idea that the sport only involves violence.  See, 
e.g., Abramson & Modzelewski, supra note 77, at 158, 160 (“When we looked at the ‘col-
lective dispositions’ and espoused understandings of this activity, it became impossible to 
sustain the argument that the subcultural world of the cage-fighter is about celebrating 
and supporting violence.  To the contrary, fighters downplay the violence and highlight 
the difficulty, competition, strategy, and challenge of fighting, often referring to it as a 
game of chess.  As Mark, a 30-year-old man working in the entertainment industry, noted, 
‘You have to set up all of your moves in advance.  You can’t just play a move at a time; you 
can’t say I’m just going to knock this guy out. . . .  I think that it [MMA] is a chess match 
and the guys that can set up those moves win.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
144 Epstein, supra note 93 (noting that one of the great pleasures that sport provides is the 
opportunity to watch “craft of a very high order, which is intrinsically interesting”); Smith, 
supra note 107 , at 58 (“A splendid athletic performance rivals any great work of art; but, 
unlike ‘a concert where the musician normally interprets the work of the composer, the 
athlete is an innovator, responding to each situation as it comes along.’” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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First Amendment as it is to justify the distinction doctrinally.  At least, 
it is difficult to justify the distinction if we accept what courts have 
been loath to accept but that the social scientific literature suggests 
we must accept—namely, that games are expressive acts, which view-
ers watch not just because they are exciting but because of what they 
signify and represent.  Moreover, although it is certainly possible to 
justify the claim that First Amendment protection should extend to 
only political speech—and therefore should include neither sport 
nor art—there are good reasons to reject this argument, however 
broadly or narrowly the category “political” is defined.  As Sunstein 
himself acknowledges, “[o]ften the deepest political challenges to the 
existing order can be found in art, literature, music, or sexual expres-
sion.”145  Spectator sports also, as we have seen, provide an important 
arena for challenging the existing social order and, more particularly, 
dominant conventions of gender and race.  For this reason, even if 
athletes, unlike artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe, may not intend 
for their performances to “contribute to public deliberation,” 146 they 
may in fact quite powerfully do so.  For this reason, even if plausible 
arguments can be made that spectator sports, like art, should receive 
lesser protection than other forms of speech, it is difficult to justify the 
categorical denial of First Amendment protection to either genre of 
expression—at least it is if we believe, as Jack Balkin recently argued, 
that “true democracy means allowing people not only to have a say 
about who represents them in a legislature, or what laws are passed, 
but also to have a say about the shape and growth of the culture that 
they live in . . . .”147 
C.  Pragmatic Implications 
There are, in addition, no other, more pragmatic reasons to deny 
First Amendment protection to spectator sports but to extend it to art 
and other genres of audience-oriented entertainment.  The recogni-
tion of spectator sports as speech would not, for example, threaten 
the fundamental First Amendment distinction between speech and 
conduct by allowing “an apparently limitless variety of conduct [to] 
be labeled ‘speech.’”148  This is a common concern in the expressive 
conduct context when courts are frequently forced to wrestle with the 
 
145 Sunstein, supra note 123, at 308. 
146  Id. at 306. 
147 Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2004). 
148 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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implications of extending First Amendment protection to conduct 
that is not only non-linguistic—and therefore does not fit our con-
ventional understanding of speech as “the communication . . . of 
thoughts in spoken words”149—but may also be conventional and 
hence widespread.  At least one court has suggested that fear of an 
all-encompassing First Amendment—in which everything is protect-
ed, and hence nothing is protected—influenced its deliberations re-
garding the constitutional status of spectator sports.150 
This fear is unfounded.  Just as extending First Amendment pro-
tection to dance performances does not mean that all kinds of dance 
are necessarily protected, extending First Amendment protection to 
spectator sports would not mean that the First Amendment would be 
“applicable to all athletic endeavors.”151  Recreational sports would 
remain unprotected—at least as a categorical matter.  Of course, 
there may be occasions in which recreational athletes, like recrea-
tional dancers, may be able to invoke the protections of the First 
Amendment.  Think, for example, of an anti-war protestor who jogs 
around town wearing a sign that says something like, “End the War 
Now.”  His act would obviously receive protection for the same reason 
that those of the schoolchildren in Tinker did:  because, in the partic-
ular context in which it was performed, it both expressed and ap-
peared likely to convey a “particularized message.”  However, recrea-
tional athletics, like going to school, would not be categorically 
presumed to be an expressive act.  It is only spectator sports which 
are entitled to categorical First Amendment protection for the same 
reason that art and other forms of entertainment are:  because, by 
addressing a public audience, athletes participate in the formation of 
democratic public attitudes and beliefs. 
Nor should it be terribly difficult to distinguish recreational from 
spectator sports.  Spectator sports are sports that are intended to be 
seen by an audience; to use Justice Daniel Souter’s language from his 
Barnes concurrence, they are sports that are “directed to an actual or 
hypothetical audience . . . .]”152  While there may be some cases in 
which it is difficult to determine whether a given athletic perfor-
mance is or is not “directed at an actual or hypothetical audience”—
 
149 Speech Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/speech (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
150 Top Rank, Inc. v. Fla. State Boxing Comm’n, 837 So. 2d 496, 502 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (“I am in fact an enthusiastic sports fan, but I do not believe we should dilute the 
significance of First Amendment protection by making it applicable to all athletic en-
deavors.”). 
151 Id. 
152 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
Apr. 2014] SPORT AS SPEECH 1153 
 
think for example of the pickup basketball games discussed in Part 
II—in most cases, the distinction between recreational and spectator 
sports should be relatively easy to draw.  All sports whose perfor-
mance fans or family members typically watch, either from the stands 
or on their television, should be included in the category of spectator 
sports.  Activities that individuals engage in purely for pleasure or fit-
ness should not.  Although these acts obviously have expressive mean-
ing for those who engage in them, they do not have the kind of ex-
pressive meaning that the First Amendment has historically privileged 
and therefore, like the recreational ballroom dancing in Stanglin, are 
not entitled to First Amendment protection in the absence of a show-
ing of specific intent. 
Recognizing spectator sports as an expressive activity would also 
not impede the effective governmental regulation of the public 
sphere—another worry that is frequently raised when questions of 
expanding the category of speech occur.153 Governmental actors 
would be able to regulate the time, place, and manner in which 
games of spectator sports occur in just the same way as they currently 
regulate the time, place and manner in which concerts, plays, and 
dance performances take place.154  They could even ban a particularly 
dangerous sport if the ban left open ample alternative channels for 
the communication of that sport’s message and was genuinely di-
rected at the sport’s physical dangers.155  They simply would not be 
 
153 For a particularly forceful articulation of this concern, see Justice Stephen Breyer’s dis-
sent in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2675 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To 
apply a ‘heightened’ standard of review in such cases as a matter of course would risk 
what then-Justice Rehnquist . . . described as a ‘retur[n] to the bygone era of Lochner v. 
New York . . . in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic 
regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate 
means for the State to implement its considered policies.’” (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
154 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (upholding a city regula-
tion limiting the volume of amplified noise at a public concert band shell as a reasonable 
regulation of the time, place, and manner in which public concerts took place on the 
grounds that it was content neutral and “narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest[:]” namely, protecting citizens from unwelcome noise); Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (“Expression, whether oral or written or 
symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.  We 
have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”). 
155 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571 (upholding a ban on nude dancing on the grounds that “the re-
quirement that the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the dance of what-
ever erotic message it conveys”); Clark, 486 U.S. at 294–95 (upholding a ban on sleeping 
in national parks as a “defensible . . . time, place, or manner restriction” on expression 
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able to ban the performance of a sport or the training necessary to 
allow that performance, or otherwise target those who produce, pro-
mote, or take part in the sport, because of the messages that its per-
formances convey.  Under the principles that inform the contempo-
rary view of the First Amendment, this would obviously be a good 
thing.  As Justice Brennan noted in Texas v. Johnson, “[i]f there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”156 
Although the sheer popularity of sports works as a kind of prophy-
lactic against repression—after all, who would want to vote for the 
politician who banned baseball?—spectator sports, like all other pub-
lic sphere activities, are vulnerable to government censorship.  Re-
cent efforts in both the United Kingdom and the United States to 
ban the sport of boxing, and the successful efforts of opponents of 
mixed martial arts in the United States to get the sport banned in var-
ious states, demonstrate as much.157  Serious health and safety con-
cerns obviously played a role in the move to ban these sports, but so 
too did concerns with both the violent and hyper-masculine messages 
both sports were perceived to send.  In the United Kingdom, for ex-
ample, opponents of boxing compared the sport to pornography;  
just as pornography, by valorizing the subjugation of women, de-
praves and corrupts those who consume it, so too, they argued, does 
boxing, by valorizing violence and depraving and corrupting its 
fans.158  Similar concerns with the effect of sports’ messages on its au-
diences informed the anti-MMA movement in the United States.  
Sponsors of the bill to ban MMA in New York asserted, for example, 
that the ban was justified because the sport of MMA was “disgraceful, 
animalistic and disgusting” and “sets an abominable example for our 
youth.”159  
 
given no evidence that the regulation targeted speech or attempted to ban sleeping alto-
gether);. 
156 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
157 For a discussion of the issues involved in the anti-boxing movement in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, see Ken Jones, A Key Moral Issue:  Should Boxing be Banned?, 4 
CULTURE, SPORT, SOC’Y 63 (2001) (presenting safety, health, intentional harm, and vio-
lence-based arguments for banning boxing).  For a discussion of the anti-MMA move-
ment in the United States, see Geoff Varney, Fighting for Respect:  MMA’s Struggle for Ac-
ceptance and How the Muhammad Ali Act Would Give it a Sporting Chance, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 
269 (2009) (discussing the history of MMA in the United States and efforts to ban MMA). 
158 Jones, supra note 157, at 69 (comparing and likening the harmful effects on citizens of 
viewing pornography to watching boxing matches). 
159 James Dao, Senate Chief in Albany, Reversing Himself, Says He Backs a Ban on Ultimate Fighting, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997 at B7. 
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Whatever we may feel about either sport, arguments that they 
should be banned—and in the United States, the successful enact-
ment of such bans—premised, at least in part, on the dangerous, dis-
gusting, or disgraceful messages that they communicate to their audi-
ences clearly implicate a “bedrock principle” of First Amendment 
concern.  Yet, under the precedents outlined in Part I of this Article, 
the First Amendment has no relevance to struggles over the status of 
these sports, and the government retains its power, in this arena of 
public life if no other, to act as a moral censor. 
D.  Indirect Benefits 
Recognizing spectator sports as First Amendment-protected ex-
pression would therefore help safeguard an important sphere of cul-
tural expression in the United States from governmental repression 
and political control.  It would have two other, more indirect, bene-
fits as well. 
First, it would help clarify what is at present the rather vexing case 
law governing art and entertainment.  In 1981, Justice Byron White 
declared, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, that “[e]ntertainment, 
as well as political and ideological speech, is protected [by the First 
Amendment]; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and tel-
evision, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, 
fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”160  The sports cases make 
clear that this is not in fact true.  Nonetheless, courts continue to as-
sert that entertainment in general is protected by the First Amend-
ment,161 even as others note that, in fact, it is not.162 
The recognition of spectator sports as a constitutionally protected 
activity would help clarify matters by bringing, for the first time, all 
genres of audience-oriented entertainment under the First Amend-
ment’s purview.  Non-audience-oriented entertainment, such as gam-
 
160 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). 
161 Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 211 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[L]ive musical enter-
tainment . . . is unquestionably speech and expression subject to the guarantees of the 
First Amendment.” (quoting Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 2004)); Wil-
lis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that musical per-
formances are entitled to First Amendment protection); Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 
687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that 
‘[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pic-
tures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical 
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.’” (quoting Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)). 
162 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[t]he 
passage . . . from Schad cannot have been meant literally”). 
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bling and recreational athletics, would remain outside the First 
Amendment guarantee.  Strictly speaking, therefore, Justice White’s 
claim would still not be true—that is, if we define entertainment 
broadly, to include all activities designed to provide participants 
amusement and pleasure, rather than more narrowly, to refer only to 
“amusement or diversion provided especially by performers” (as Mer-
riam-Webster, for example, defines the term).163 
Nonetheless, the distinction between audience-directed and other 
forms of entertainment is, unlike the current distinction between ath-
letic and artistic kinds of audience-directed entertainment acts, a jus-
tified one, well-grounded in the First Amendment’s traditional priori-
ties and concerns, specifically its core concern with speech about 
matters of “public concern.”164  While gambling and mountain-biking 
are activities that take place in public, they are not activities that ad-
dress themselves to a public audience.  They do not, as a result, im-
plicate the same First Amendment values as do audience-oriented 
performances like plays, books, and, of course, spectator sports—all 
of which, by addressing a public audience, function to communicate 
and express matters of public concern. 
Extending protection to spectator sports would therefore replace 
what I have suggested is ultimately an arbitrary distinction between 
different kinds of audience-oriented expressive acts (namely, artistic 
versus athletic performances) with a distinction that instead recog-
nizes the different kinds of social relationships and constitutional in-
terests involved in practices that address a public audience, and 
therefore have the power to broadly impact public attitudes and be-
liefs, and those that do not.  Extending protection to all forms of au-
dience-oriented entertainment would also finally expunge from the 
doctrine the troubling distinction between “entertainment” and “in-
formation” that the Court rejected as a plausible basis for distinguish-
ing between protected and unprotected speech over sixty years ago 
and yet which courts continue to invoke to justify their conclusions 
 
163 Entertainment Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam/webster.com/dictionary/entertainment (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
164 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (“We 
have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.  It is 
speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s pro-
tection.’”) (quoting First Na’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).  See also 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (stating that speech on pub-
lic issues occupies the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); Garri-
son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[Speech] concerning public affairs is more 
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”). 
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that spectator sports do not constitute a form of expression worthy of 
First Amendment protection.165 
In addition to the clarity it would help bring to the case law gov-
erning entertainment, recognizing spectator sports as an expressive 
activity would clarify the doctrine in another way:  by avoiding what 
we might call the “media fetishism” that currently besets the sports 
cases.  As is true in other domains of the First Amendment, the sports 
case law treats live performance very differently than it treats the 
same performance when filmed or broadcasted.166  Under the prece-
dents discussed in Part I, live athletic performance gets effectively no 
protection.  Yet, courts generally agree that the broadcast of a sport-
ing event is a fully protected expressive act.167 
From either an audience-centric or a speaker-centric view of the 
First Amendment, however, there is little justification for treating the 
act of turning on the video camera as a constitutionally significant 
event when what is being filmed is itself an audience-oriented per-
formance like a sports game.  In other contexts, of course—where 
what is recorded is not something that was intended or performed in 
order to be seen—the act is constitutionally significant because what 
it does, in effect, is transform a non-audience-directed act (the dis-
play of the northern lights, for example)168 into something that is ad-
dressed to an audience.  This is not true, however, of the act of vide-
otaping a football game because, in that case, an audience already 
exists.  As a result, the act of videotaping a football game may enable 
more people to watch the game, thereby extending the size and 
scope of its audience, but it does not transform the game into some-
thing that is directed at a public audience. 
 
165 Supra note 36–36, and accompanying notes. 
166 For an argument about the unjustifiable distinction the First Amendment case law makes 
with respect to live and mediated performance, see Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety:  Medu-
sa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 235 (2009) (pointing out that, 
under current precedents, “sexual behavior caught on film has more speech protection 
than when it is live”). 
167 United States Satellite Broad. Co., Inc. v. Lynch, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 
1999) (holding that sports broadcasters are entitled to First Amendment protection and 
that the argument “that telecasts of boxing do not enjoy First Amendment protection be-
cause boxing is somehow ‘less valuable’ than other subjects, runs contrary to every prin-
ciple of the Free Speech Clause itself”); TVKO v. Howland, 15 OTR 335 (Or. T.C. 2001) 
(striking down a state tax law imposed solely on broadcasters of boxing matches on First 
Amendment grounds). 
168  See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concur-
ring) (stating that although a “display of northern lights [may be] entertaining[,] this 
would not make that display an expressive activity” directed to an audience). 
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Courts provide no justification for the distinction that the case law 
draws between live and broadcast sport.  Nor does the commentary.169  
An obvious explanation for the different treatment of live and medi-
ated expression might be the special solicitude due to the press un-
der the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Yet courts do not tend 
to invoke the Press Clause in these decisions; and most observers sug-
gest it to be a largely dormant source of constitutional protection.170  
In fact, what courts’ solicitude to the broadcasting of sports may re-
flect is their recognition that at least the act of watching sports is a 
constitutionally significant activity.  But, if this is the case, why does 
First Amendment protection extend only to those who watch sports 
on television, rather than in person? 
Extending free speech protection to spectator sports would there-
fore get rid of another doctrinal distinction—in this case, the distinc-
tion between live and mediatized representations of sports—that cur-
rently complicates the case law without appearing to further any of 
the purposes of the First Amendment.  It would ensure that it is not 
only the expressive interests of those who broadcast sports or watch 
sports on television that receive constitutional protection, but also the 
expressive interests of those who play and promote sports, and those 
who watch sports in person as well.  More broadly, it would ensure 
that First Amendment doctrine recognizes the expressive significance 
of spectator sports as performance, no matter the form in which it is 
performed or received.  If the act of watching sport on television is 
constitutionally protected, the act of watching sport in the stadium, 
and of playing it, should be as well.  To do otherwise is to ignore all 
the expressive interests, other than those of the broadcasters, in-
volved in the performance of a game of spectator sports. 
CONCLUSION 
Sports sociologists frequently complain about the lack of interest 
that social scientists have historically demonstrated in the topic of 
 
169 In fact, the only commentary I have been able to find that examines this question is a stu-
dent note.  See Joshua A. Stein, Note, Hitting Below the Belt:  Florida’s Taxation of Pay-Per-View 
Boxing Programming is a Content-Based Violation of the First Amendment, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 999, 
1002 (2006) (arguing that boxing deserves First Amendment protection). 
170 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a 
matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the 
freedom of the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Un-
der Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“[T]he Court has never explicitly 
recognized that the Press Clause involves any significant content different from that pro-
vided to all individuals by the prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”). 
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sport.  Indeed, for many decades, the study of sport was a topic of on-
ly marginal interest in the social sciences.  As the sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu noted in 1988, the sociology of sport faced “special difficul-
ties . . . scorned by sociologists, it is despised by sportspersons.”171  
Sport appeared too inconsequential an activity to warrant serious 
study; something that was too divorced from the concerns of the eve-
ryday social world to matter.  Indeed, sport comprises part of a 
broader category of human activities that philosophers call generally 
“play,” and that is defined by its separation from the everyday social 
world.172  It is this, perhaps, that has led to the widespread percep-
tion—a perception that courts clearly share—that sport is a merely 
“trivial” activity, entertaining, perhaps, but unimportant.173 
And yet, as the extensive body of social scientific research that has 
emerged over the two and a half decades since Bourdieu lamented 
the plight of the sport sociologist demonstrates, it is in fact because of 
its divorce from the everyday social world that sports provides such a 
powerful vehicle for the expression of social ideals and values.  By in-
sulating participants from the complexity and inequality characteris-
tic of the everyday social world, sports games provide an environment 
in which what athletes demonstrate, and what audiences watch, is the 
concentrated performance of individual skill, as revealed through the 
competitive struggle to win.  What this allows, in turn, is the expres-
sion, in a particularly powerful form, of messages about individual vir-
tue, beauty, identity, and political community. 
Social scientists’ recognition of the cultural and political signifi-
cance of spectator sports has led, over the past two decades, to an ex-
plosion of research and writing devoted to the analysis of the practice 
and the significance of sports in contemporary public culture.174  
There has not, however, been a similar reconceptualization of the 
value of sport in the First Amendment case law.  This Article has ar-
gued that, for some of the same reasons that led the Court recently to 
 
171 Pierre Bourdieu, Program for a Sociology of Sport, 5 SOC. SPORT J. 153, 153 (1988). 
172 The most famous definition of the category is that provided by Johan Huizinga in Homo 
Ludens.  Huizinga defines play as:  “a ‘free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘or-
dinary life’ . . . It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be 
gained by it.  It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according 
to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.’”  JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS 13 (1955). 
173 See, e.g., Early, supra note 135, at 2–3 (“They thought sport was a trivial subject and not 
worthy of scholarly attention.  Many dismissed sport as a passive amusement or enter-
tainment, which precluded its having any intellectual content.”). 
174 For a good overview of only some of the recent scholarship on the topic, see Robert E. 
Washington & David Karen, Sport and Society, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 187,(2001); Niko Besnier 
& Susan Brownell, Sport, Modernity, and the Body, 41 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOL. 443 (2012). 
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recognize video games as speech, spectator sports should also be rec-
ognized as expressive acts, and those who play in them, fund them or 
promote them as entitled to First Amendment protection for their 
participation in the act.  Indeed, to a more profound degree than 
video games, spectator sports provide a powerful venue for the articu-
lation, negotiation, and contestation of our popular attitudes and be-
liefs, including our attitudes and beliefs about that most central of 
American preoccupations—competition itself.175 
Given the centrality of sport to American public culture, and the 
centrality of the idea of competition to American culture and ideolo-
gy, the dismissal and general neglect of the question of the First 
Amendment status of sport is both unfortunate and unnecessary.  It is 
certainly not required by the doctrinal rules that today set the 
boundaries of the First Amendment.  Instead, as this Article has ar-
gued, denying First Amendment protection to spectator sports only 
distorts the doctrine, by maintaining in it distinctions—between in-
formation and entertainment, between athletic and artistic expres-
sion, and between live and mediated representations of sports—that 
have either been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court as a legiti-
mate basis on which to distinguish between protect and unprotected 
speech or simply do not promote any of the purposes that the First 
Amendment is intended to advance.  It is widely recognized that 
America is a “sports-crazy” country.  It is time for First Amendment 
doctrine to also recognize the expressive significance of spectator 
sports. 
 
 
175 As Gerald Early has argued, “[s]port is how human beings perform the art and craft of 
competition. . . . Trying to understand what sport is about is trying to understand what 
winning and losing are all about.”  Early, supra note 135, at 5. 
